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ABSTRACT 
 
 Albert Camuss concept of absurdity states that human existence is fundamentally chaotic 
and meaningless.  Despite this appraisal of existence, Camus tirelessly campaigned for human 
rights at a time when many intellectuals ignored the atrocities perpetrated by ideological 
compatriots.  Scholars admire Camuss courage and foresight, but few have attempted to 
systematically examine Camuss philosophical development of values.  Eric Voegelin argues that 
Camuss writings take the form of a philosophical meditation in which Camus conducted an 
analysis of existence through the medium of fictional creation.  This meditation, which Voegelin 
likens to a Platonic periagoge, allowed Camus to establish a foundation of values that remained 
consistent with the logic of the absurd and fostered an appreciation of present reality.  This study 
examines Camuss mediation by emphasizing the components that are present in his novel The 
Plague.  Camus ultimately arrives at an aesthetic theory in which he equates beauty with the 
common dignity of mankind.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1.  THE SEARCH FOR FOUNDATIONS 
Introduction  
In his Notebooks, Albert Camus documented a conversation concerning political ethics 
and moral values that was held at the home of Andre Malraux in October 1946.  In the company 
of fellow intellectuals Jean-Paul Sartre, Arthur Koestler, and Malraux, Camus posed the 
following question: 
Don’t you agree that we are all responsible for the absence of values?  What if we who all  
come out of Nietzscheanism, nihilism, and historical realism, what if we announced 
publicly that we were wrong; that there are moral values and that henceforth we shall do 
what has to be done to establish and illustrate them.  Don’t you think this might be the 
beginning of hope?1  
 
Sartre replied that he could not direct his values solely against the Soviet Union, but Koestler  
 
concurred.  “It must be said that as writers we are guilty of treason in the eyes of history if we do  
 
not denounce what deserves to be denounced.”2  
 Camus’s comments reveal that he was deeply troubled by the absence of life affirming 
values in the political dialogue of his time.  The violent history of Twentieth Century Europe 
proves that his concerns were legitimate.  Intellectuals, he thought, had reinforced this neglect of 
values by following the logic of political ideologies and philosophical principles to their absolute 
conclusions.  Acknowledging his own culpability, Camus considered the possibility of 
renouncing his own intellectual tradition in order to combat the blatant disregard for the value of 
human life and happiness.  Furthermore, Camus suggested that intellectuals or artists have the 
ability and responsibility to elucidate these values and their source. 
                                                 
1Albert Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951, trans. Philip Thody (New York: Marlowe & 
Company, 1996), pp. 145-46. 
2Ibid, p. 146. 
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 Camus’s concerns as expressed in this conversation draw attention to the question posed 
in this study.  What is the foundation of Albert Camus’s values?  Specifically, how can one 
derive values from an existence that lacks meaning or coherence?  Camus held such a view of 
existence, considering it to be absurd, but his life, speeches, and writings reveal a definite 
concern for the value of human life and the dignity of man.  The purpose of this study is to 
consider the values that Camus held to be important and to identify the source and development 
of these values.  As the following discussion shows, the affirmation of values was a challenging, 
but important task for Camus.   
 In his early works, Camus established the concept of absurdity as the true condition of 
man confronting the outside world.  This concept of absurdity rests upon the assertion that 
human beings desire unity, meaning, and happiness.  Confronted with the world, which is 
essentially chaotic, meaningless, and cruel, the human being finds himself in an absurd situation.  
“The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence 
of the world.”3  Originally intending to establish absurdity as a first principle, Camus came to 
realize that this principle led to a startling conclusion.  
Awareness of the absurd, when we first claim to deduce a rule of behavior from it, makes 
murder seem a matter of indifference, to say the least, and hence possible.  If we believe 
in nothing, if nothing has any meaning and we can affirm no values whatsoever, then 
everything is possible and nothing has any importance.4         
 
Camus realized that the notion of the absurd is not instructive in and of itself, and it seems to 
allow for moral relativism insofar as it does not affirm the existence of values.  Without “higher 
                                                 
3Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans. Justin O’Brien (New 
York: Vintage International, 1991), p. 28. 
4Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage International, 
1991), p. 5. Emphasis added. 
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values” to guide one’s actions, Camus argued, the only “guiding principle” is “efficacy” or the 
demonstration of strength.5
 Of course, Camus witnessed the consequences of efficacy as a rule of action in the 
destructive clashes of World War II.  During this time period, Camus witnessed the systematic 
eradication of human beings in the name of utopian ideas.  At the onset of the war, he noted in 
his journal, “Often the values on which our life is built have almost collapsed.  But never before 
have these values and those we love been threatened all together and all at the same time.  Never 
before have we been so completely handed over to total destruction.”6  The relentless efficiency 
of totalitarian regimes attested to the destructive consequences of contemporary nihilism.  
 Having been deeply affected by these consequences, Camus sought to critique the 
nihilism which led to “logical crime” in his essay, The Rebel.  “A nihilist,” he wrote, “is not one 
who believes in nothing, but one who does not believe in what exists.”7  Nihilism is therefore a 
characteristic of futuristic or idealistic doctrines which seek to impose a false value above that of 
human life.  “If nihilism is the inability to believe, then its most serious symptom is not found in 
atheism, but in the inability to believe in what is, to see what is happening, and to live life as it is 
offered.  This infirmity is at the root of all idealism.”8  Perhaps the most common manifestation 
of this idealism is the desire for order. 
                                                 
5Ibid, p. 5. 
6Albert Camus, Notebooks: 1935-1942, trans. Philip Thody (New York: Marlowe & 
Company, 1996), p. 149. 
7Camus, The Rebel, p. 69. 
8Ibid, p. 67. 
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 “The most elementary form of rebellion,” Camus wrote, “paradoxically, expresses an 
aspiration to order.”9  This desire for order reveals that rebellion is metaphysical in character 
because such a desire is a protest against the human being’s actual condition in a disordered 
world.  Absolute order is essentially an idealistic demand in a world characterized by absurdity. 
Such idealistic protests culminate in the death of God and the deification of man.  “His 
insurrection against his condition becomes an unlimited campaign against the heavens . . .  Then 
begins the desperate effort to create, at the price of crime and murder if necessary, the dominion 
of man.”10  Thus, Camus divulged the absolute consequence of nihilism.  Refusing to accept his 
absurd condition, the metaphysical rebel places the unattainable value of complete order above 
the existing value of human life.  After eliminating God, man is put in His place. 
 As it seems, the establishment of life affirming values would be a powerful response to 
the idealistic or futuristic values of nihilism and total revolution.  Camus clearly valued present 
experience over utopian values set in the distant future, but he did not explicitly establish the 
foundation on which present experience is to be valued. This is not to say that Camus’s values 
were groundless or based on speculation, but that Camus had difficulty in presenting this 
foundation.  His failure to do so along with his reluctance to take sides on some political issues, 
such as the Algerian conflict, earned him considerable criticism from his contemporaries.  
Holding the values of human life above the values of political doctrines, Camus was somewhat 
of an oddity juxtaposed to other French leftists, such as Sartre, who conveniently overlooked the 
oppression of the Soviet Union.  Instead, Camus maintained that human life should be valued 
above political beliefs.  
                                                 
9Ibid, p. 23. 
10Ibid, p. 25. 
 4
 The necessity of a foundation for values was not a trivial philosophical preoccupation for 
Camus.  The establishment of values was important to him because of the criminal indifference 
shown towards the value of human life during his own lifetime.  This issue, however, is still very 
important today in the Twenty-First Century.  In this world of international terrorism and 
technological alienation, man still faces the dilemma of how one embraces values without 
subscribing to foundational ideologies.  In this search, Camus’s own progression can be 
especially instructive.  Camus ultimately earned the reputation of a human rights activist before 
such a position was popular.  Because his writings reveal such unmistakable decency and 
concern for the plight of mankind, the values which guided his writings are worthy of 
examination.   
 This thesis will examine the values that Camus upheld, and especially, the foundation 
upon which he based these values. Because Camus considered novels to be the most fruitful form 
of philosophical examination, this thesis will focus primarily on Camus’s treatment of values in 
his most mature fictional work, The Plague. Furthermore, in an effort to add structure to this 
search, The Plague will be treated in the context of a periagoge as described by Eric Voegelin. 
Before discussing this Voegelinian taxonomy, however, it is necessary to survey the literature on 
the subject at hand in order to see what others have written about Camus’s values.  
Literature Review  
Camus’s reputation for morality and decency has led many authors to examine the details 
of his life and writings.  Among these secondary works, two detailed biographies provide 
information on Camus’s personal influences as well as his sensitivities and reactions to the 
political events that transpired during his life.  Of the two biographies, Herbert Lottman’s work, 
Albert Camus: A Biography, is a more detailed account of Camus’s life, but he does not address 
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the problem that Camus faced when attempting to uphold affirmative values in a chaotic world.  
Lottman offers descriptions of the various influences on the young Camus, such as his father’s 
repulsion to the death penalty and his high school philosophy professor’s aversion to political 
orthodoxy.11  Obviously, these experiences held some importance in Camus’s recognition of 
values, but Lottman offers little more than a description of these experiences.  He does not 
consider how these experiences developed into Camus’s affirmation of certain values.  
 Oliver Todd’s biography, unlike Lottman’s, acknowledges the challenge that Camus 
faced while attempting to develop and maintain positive values in a world devoid of transcendent 
meaning.  Commenting on Camus’s progression after completing his dissertation, Todd writes, 
“Camus had freed himself from God, but not from the need to construct a code of behavior.”12  
This freedom from God would undoubtedly develop into the notion of absurdity, but Todd 
argues that Camus’s attitude towards absurdity continuously evolved, changing noticeably with 
the emergence of The Plague.  He claims that during this period, Camus began to distance 
himself from the absurd and to recognize the necessity of value judgments in the idea of revolt.13  
Although Camus probably recognized the consequences of absurdity much earlier than Todd 
suggests, the biographer astutely realizes that these consequences created a dilemma for Camus.  
“Like his characters Rieux, Peneloux, and the journalist Rambert, Camus sought a foundation for 
his values.”14  Todd does not speculate on how one may identify this foundation, but he claims 
                                                 
11Herbert Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography (Corte Madera: Ginko, 1997),              
pp. 23-24, 86. 
12Oliver Todd, Albert Camus: A Life, trans. Benjamin Ivry (New York: Carol & Graf 
Publishers, 2000), p. 45. 
13Ibid, pp. 167-68. 
14Ibid, p. 215. 
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that Camus was envious of the unambiguous foundation of Christian values.  According to Todd, 
Camus liked the fact that Christian values are provided in advance, but he considered these 
values to be irreconcilable with the world.15  Todd’s biography reveals that Camus admired the 
certainty of religious values, but he would not acquiesce to a foundation that he considered 
dishonest. 
 Focusing upon the political dispositions of twentieth century French intellectuals in his 
book, The Burden of Responsibility, Tony Judt dedicates a chapter to Camus and his politics 
entitled “The Reluctant Moralist.”  In this fairly typical characterization of Camus as a moralist, 
Judt argues that Camus became increasingly apolitical after witnessing the ease with which 
Vichy collaborators were marked for death after the German occupation of France.16  This 
experience, Judt argues, caused Camus to develop a suspicion of power, which led to his theory 
of limits as a necessary check on rebellion.17  Judt also describes Camus as having been out of 
place and uncomfortable within the French intellectual milieu because he placed moral concerns 
above political allegiance.  “In place of reason Camus invoked responsibility.  Indeed, his 
writings bear witness to an ethic of responsibility deliberately set against the ethic of conviction 
that marked and marred his contemporaries.”18  Camus’s responsibility was to uphold the value 
of life above abstract political values.  According to Judt, Camus wished to call upon “absolute 
standards and measures of morality, justice and freedom whenever it was appropriate to do so” 
                                                 
15Ibid, p. 215. 
16Tony Judt, The Burden of Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998),      
p. 107. 
17Ibid, p. 127. 
18Ibid, p. 124. 
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rather than having to balance the injustices of the East and the West in order to appear non-
partisan.19  In referring to absolute standards of morality, Judt argues that Camus’s task of 
establishing values would have been easier if he had identified an honest and definitive 
foundation of these values.  Apparently, Judt does not think that Camus ever developed these 
absolute standards, and his failure to do so left him vulnerable to criticism by intellectuals of the 
right and left. 
 Stephen Eric Bronner, who also classifies Camus as a moralist, identifies the challenge 
faced by Camus in developing values without a sturdy foundation.  The Myth of Sisyphus, he 
writes, “offers a new existential challenge: the possibility of experiencing happiness without 
hope.”20  His two books on Camus are partially biographical and partially critical, but neither 
provides specific detail on Camus’s development of positive values.  He gives ample 
biographical descriptions of the young writer’s influences such as his poor upbringing, the 
“pagan preoccupation” of his high school philosophy professor, Jean Grenier, his early bouts 
with death and illness, and his Catholic upbringing.21  These influences are important, but 
Bronner does not discuss how these influences contributed to Camus’s development of values.  
He writes, “[Camus] is willing to rely neither on formal logic nor experience.  He sees his 
method, which he never really articulates, as standing somewhere between reason and 
intuition.”22  Although this description is not specific, it reveals that Camus relied on his 
                                                 
19Ibid, p. 115. 
20Stephen Eric Bronner, Camus: Portrait of a Moralist (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 47. 
21Stephen Eric Bronner, Albert Camus: The Thinker, The Artist, The Man (Danbury: 
Franklin Watts, 1996), pp. 13-19. 
22Bronner, Camus: Portrait of a Moralist, pp. 44-45.  
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“feelings” in the form of intuition with an appeal to reason for lucid judgment.  Recognizing that 
any systematic development of values is absent from Camus’s work, Bronner comes to the 
conclusion that Camus’s “Mediterranean thinking” serves as a moderating device to confront 
nihilism.23  Mediterranean thinking refers to the prevailing mentality of citizens living in 
countries that border the Mediterranean Sea.  With an emphasis on physical experience, 
happiness, and creativity, the Mediterranean mentality stands in opposition to that of Western 
European society which is preoccupied with rationality and efficiency.  Absent from Bronner’s 
analysis is a discussion of how Mediterranean thinking and the various influences of Camus’s 
life guided his moral progression.  
 Scholars who admire or condemn Camus’s ethical stance have attempted to follow his 
moral progression logically.  Thomas Landon Thorson, for example, follows this progression 
logically from the basis of the absurd.  In an article written only four years after Camus’s death, 
Thorson upholds Camus as the epitome of a political philosopher.  “Like Plato,” he writes, “his 
[Camus’s] major task as an intellectual became the search for reasons which would support the 
restoration of order and justice.”24  Unlike Plato, Camus could not appeal to transcendence in 
support of these values.  Thorson argues that the idea of transcendence had been considerably 
discredited before Camus’s lifetime due to “persuasive negations contained in the philosophy of 
his immediate predecessors.”25  Nietzsche had leveled a scathing critique of transcendent appeal 
and its ability to distract man from the reality of the present.  This negation of transcendence was 
                                                 
23Ibid, p. 85. 
24Thomas Landon Thorson, “Albert Camus and the Rights of Man,” Ethics 74, no. 4 
(1964): p. 283. 
25Ibid, p. 283. 
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very persuasive indeed, and it had a tremendous influence on Camus.   Following this intellectual 
tradition, Camus had to use the idea of absurdity as his starting place.  Because hope and suicide 
are not viable reactions to the absurd, man is left only with the option of living with the absurd; 
this option affirms the value of human life.  Thorson places the affirmation of human life at the 
core of Camus’s absurdist reasoning, but he acknowledges that this is only an individual rather 
than a collective solution.26  Unable to use a Platonic or “traditional” argument, Camus bases his 
collective justification of values on his idea of revolt in the name of life.  Thorson correctly 
observes that Camus’s experimentation with the concept of revolt reveals “limits” on action or 
some standard for “positive value,” but Camus arrives at these implications with difficulty and 
without sufficient clarity.27  Thorson’s conclusion states that the affirmation of life, traced back 
to the logic of the absurd, allows Camus to uphold revolt while rejecting “new values” such as 
“reason” and “history.”28  Indeed, the affirmation of human life is consistent with Camus’s logic, 
and Thorson’s work summarizes this progression, highlighting the fact that Camus gives an 
adequate defense of human life without appealing to a transcendent ground.  However, Thorson 
overlooks values other than human life such as solidarity, love, and happiness which must also 
be justified in terms of the absurd.  Because Camus considered the absurd to be a primary truth, 
all values had to be commensurate with that truth.  
 Perhaps one of Camus’s harshest critics, Herbert Hochberg similarly describes the 
progression from The Myth of Sisyphus to The Rebel as an attempt by Camus to establish 
                                                 
26Ibid, p. 288. 
27Ibid, p. 289. 
28Ibid, p. 290. 
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absurdity as the human condition and then to derive an ethic from that condition.29  His analysis 
illuminates the challenge faced by Camus in deriving this ethic, but he ultimately argues that 
Camus failed because the notion of absurdity is unclear and the ethic derived from it is non-
existent.  Camus’s position of absurdity, he argues, is attributable to his admiration of the monist 
pattern developed by the African neoplatonist, Plotinus, which relies on the mystic notion of a 
unifying transcendent source of all being and value known as “the One.”  He further argues that 
Camus’s insistence on a rational comprehension of this unifying principle creates a criterion that 
is impossible to satisfy and ultimately results in the notion of absurdity.30  The explanation for 
this contradiction lies in the finite nature of human reason which would be incapable of 
understanding something infinite and transcendent such as the One.  “[Camus’s] lack of 
coherence may be explained by the fact that, having denied a transcendent source of value, he 
must, if he is to have an ethic at all, anchor his values somehow in the world of ordinary 
experience.”31  Ordinary experience, however, is not as barren as Hochberg would like the reader 
to think.  Other critics have seized upon the potential of human experience to give rise to positive 
values, but Hochberg seems to dismiss experience as a possible source. 
 David Sprintzen’s book, Camus: A Critical Examination, is the most fecund secondary 
work concerning Camus’s development of values.  For Camus, he argues, “values can only be 
rooted in the experiential soil fertilized by lucid consciousness.”32  He subscribes to the general 
                                                 
29Herbert Hochberg, “Albert Camus and the Ethics of Absurdity,” Ethics 75, no. 2 
(1965): p. 87.  
30Ibid, p. 89.  
31Ibid, p. 92. 
32David Sprintzen, Camus: A Critical Examination (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1988), p. 63. 
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consensus that Camus had to find his values in the world of experience, but Sprintzen’s 
description of this experience, and its significance for Camus, is more complex.  Rather than 
argue that Camus’s “nostalgia for unity” is a borrowed concept, as Hochberg does, Sprintzen 
claims that this nostalgia itself is borne out of experience, and Camus felt this appeal 
personally.33  Although Sprintzen does not clearly outline Camus’s method of deriving values 
from experience, he hints that the method is based on honesty in which Camus found it necessary 
to deny any values imparted on the world from without, such as a transcendent source.34  This is 
not to say that values are formally deduced from first principles, but “lived prereflectively until 
their denial is felt to be unbearable.”35  Indeed, Sprintzen is one of the few authors to realize that 
revolt does not create values, but attests to their existence.  Unfortunately, he offers little insight 
into the “prereflective” nature of values outside of his assertion that they emerge from a type of 
dialogue which he labels “intersubjective human experience.”36  Considering the relatively broad 
approach of Sprintzen’s analysis, his attention to Camus’s existential dilemma is praiseworthy.  
Furthermore, he shows that human experience is a vast and complex reservoir of values 
revealing that logical deduction is inherently limited in developing positive values.    
 Further removing Camus from the sphere of logical deduction, John Krapp claims that 
Camus explored the nature of values in an aesthetic manner by focusing on “ethical fiction.”37   
                                                 
33Ibid, p. 55. 
34Ibid, p. 18. 
35Ibid, pp. 129-30. 
36Ibid, p. 131. 
37John Krapp, An Aesthetics of Morality: Pedagogic Voice and Moral Dialogue in Mann, 
Camus, Conrad, and Dostoevsky (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), p. 71.  
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Harboring disdain for moral monologues, Camus used this fiction not to present to the reader 
some ethical doctrine, but to present a dialogue of ethical voices from which the reader can 
freely choose.  “The dynamics of this dialogue,” Krapp argues, “offers a site where the structural 
component of ethical claims may be investigated.”38  Therefore, Krapp recognizes in Camus’s 
fiction a balance between the ethical and the aesthetic.  The ethic is presented in the “competing 
pedagogic voices” of the various characters; whereas, the aesthetic dimension involves 
maintaining the “structural tension” among these voices so that one does not gain authority over 
the rest.39  Examining Camus’s novel The Plague, Krapp argues that the novel is not a lesson on 
morality, but “a paradigm for the way moral consciousness may be nourished aesthetically in the 
conflict between ethical voices.”40  Following Krapp’s analysis, it appears that Camus used his 
aesthetic abilities to present a dialogue, implying that values will necessarily be based on an 
intersubjective moral consciousness.  Indeed, Krapp comments that almost all of the characters 
in The Plague resist the disease on the basis of communal solidarity.41  For one who is seeking 
some further insight into the nature of values, Krapp is somewhat disappointing except for his 
ability to recognize fiction as the vehicle through which Camus explored the contingent nature of 
values.  Brilliantly describing the aesthetic method employed in Camus’s fiction, Krapp offers 
little more than the obvious position that Camus favors values that arise from communal 
solidarity and open exchange of ideas.  As to the structural elements of Camus’s philosophical 
progression in this aesthetic paradigm, Krapp is silent.  
                                                 
38Ibid, p. 82. 
39Ibid, pp. 82, 98. 
40Ibid, p. 98. 
41Ibid, p. 91. 
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 It is not surprising that few authors offer a structural analysis of Camus’s development of 
values because Camus himself never clearly outlined such a structure.  That is not to say that a 
structural progression cannot be identified in Camus’s works.  The assumption here is that 
Camus essentially lived through this progression and did not formally outline it in his written 
works.  Still, if such a progression exists, it should be identifiable given a broad treatment of 
Camus’s writings.  Eric Voegelin takes such a broad approach and identifies a structural and 
taxonomic progression in Camus’s works that is invaluable to the project at hand.  Voegelin’s 
classification of Camus is similar to Krapp’s.  Voegelin also argues that Camus explored the 
development of values in an aesthetic fashion, but Voegelin provides a structure to this aesthetic 
progression that is grounded in a Platonic meditative process. 
Eric Voegelin’s Structural Taxonomy 
As the preceding overview of the extant literature reveals, the answer to the question 
posed in this study is very elusive.  The formulation of values is not a topic that Camus 
addressed directly or frequently, although it perceivably caused him considerable consternation.  
Eric Voegelin seized upon this uncertainty in his short commentary on Camus in Anamnesis.  
Voegelin sees in Camus’s work a process of maturation that coincides with his analysis of 
existence.  He refers to this process as a “meditation” or “ascent” and refers to Camus’s work as 
a “prototype of the existential catharsis of our era.”42  Elaborating on this prototype, Voegelin 
organizes Camus’s work into a structural taxonomy depicting three stages of a Platonic ascent or 
periagoge.  
                                                 
42Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans. M. J. Hanak, ed. David Walsh (Columbia: University 
of Missouri Press, 2002), p. 369. 
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The taxonomic progression into which Voegelin places Camus is largely reflective of 
Voegelin’s ontological concerns rather than Camus’s.  The meditation, Voegelin argues, is an 
applicable model for analyzing the nature of existence and confronting the uncertainty revealed 
in this exercise.  In Voegelin’s ontological construction, this uncertainty arises from the nature of 
existence, which can be described as a tension between the immanent and the divine.  This 
tension is to be endured, or one runs the risk of losing contact with reality itself.  “When a person 
refuses to live in existential tension towards the [divine] ground, or if he rebels against that 
ground, refusing to participate in reality and thus to experience his own reality as a man . . . it is 
he who loses contact with reality.”43  Such a loss of contact with reality implies a refusal to 
acknowledge the truth of existence as it is experienced in the present.  It is a disconnect from 
lived experience.  This disconnect is especially problematic because it creates a type of spiritual 
vacuum in which one places dogmatic principles.  Voegelin argues that his era is partially 
characterized by the attempt to fill this “loss of reality” with a “second reality” in which man 
“generate[s] substitute images of reality in order to gain order and direction for his existence and 
actions in the world.”44  The dominance of second realities, according to Voegelin, leads to 
“massive disturbances of social order” because man bases his actions on a perverted view of 
reality.45  Similar to absolutist ideologies, second realities often result in rebellious attempts to 
transform the world in a radical fashion. 
Voegelin admires Camus’s meditation primarily because he maintained an open hostility 
to political dogma.  “The impact of Camus’s work seems to stem from the inexorability of his 
                                                 
43Ibid, p. 368. 
44Ibid, pp. 368-69. 
45Ibid, p. 369. 
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endeavor to achieve purity by purging himself of substitute realities.”46  For Voegelin, Camus 
represents a positive alternative to the loss of reality.  Where this loss often manifests itself in 
“defiant revolution,” it is “experienced and suffered” in the works of Camus.47  Voegelin equates 
this suffering with reaching the depths of reality symbolized in Plato’s cave allegory.  “With the 
awareness of suffering from a shadowy life, however, the depths of the turning around, the 
periagoge, are reached and the ascent from the cave toward the light can begin.”48
Placing Camus into the framework of the periagoge, Voegelin divides his “meditative 
progress” into three phases.  The first phase is “governed by the experience of the absurdity of 
existence,” as it is presented by Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus.49  Awareness of the absurd in 
this phase allows Camus to reach the depths of reality and begin the ascent toward the truth.  
The Rebel, Camus’s essay on revolt, represents the second phase in which Camus endures 
absurdity while resisting the temptation of second realities.  Voegelin writes,  
In [The Rebel] Camus masters the second phase of the ascent as he accepts that the 
uncertainty concerning the meaning of existence has to be endured as the burden of 
existence, and as he seeks to keep the tension free from dogmatic substitute realties, be 
they theological, metaphysical or ideological variety.50  
 
Camus’s ability to endure uncertainty rather than rebel against it is indicative of what Voegelin 
calls “efforts to refill the form of reality once again with the reality of existential tension.”51  
                                                 
46Ibid, p. 371. 
47Ibid, p. 369. 
48Ibid. 
49Ibid. 
50Ibid. 
51Ibid. 
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Voegelin conceptualizes the uncertainty of existence as a product of finite human reason, and he 
considers this uncertainty to be irreconcilable; therefore, he rejects any attempts at achieving 
unity through political means.  
 Finally, Voegelin reveals that the third phase of the ascent was left unfinished because of 
Camus’s premature death.  He speculates that Camus had progressed beyond rebellion toward 
“an active life ordered by a loving tension toward the divine ground, a tension in which the 
autonomous self dissolves.”52  This terminology is obviously more Voegelinian than Camusian, 
but his speculation on Camus’s move toward affirmation suggests a definitive break with 
existentialism because the individual is no longer plagued by the unbearable freedom to act, but 
experiences the tension of existence in an ordered life.  By Voegelin’s description, the 
progression of Camus’s work can be viewed as a maturation process from displeasure and 
defiance to appreciation and affirmation.  The rebel, whose actions arise from the negation of 
this tension, is supplanted by the “man who lives in the here and now of the tension toward the 
ground.”53  Voegelin gives a compelling description of how this comes about, 
From its beginning the work [the corpus of Camus’s writings] was deliberately conceived 
with a view to its end, as a meditation within the medium of myth.  But in the end, to the 
degree that his quest becomes knowingly luminous to itself, the existential mood changes 
. . .  The revolt is directed against the presence of life in the tension toward the divine 
ground; it manifests itself in the ideological apocalypse of futuristic utopias.  When the 
futuristic alienation from the presence subsides, the joy of the here and now of existence 
begins stirring again; kakodaimonia [mean spiritedness] gives way to the eudaimonia 
[spiritual joyfulness].54
 
                                                 
52Ibid, pp. 370-371. 
53Ibid, p. 370. 
54Ibid, p. 388. 
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Camus’s mastery of the second phase, Voegelin suggests, allowed him to move through revolt to 
the third phase, an appreciation of the here and now.  This appreciation is equivalent to the 
affirmation of the value of life, love and happiness insofar as these are values of the present 
rather that the distant future. 
 Voegelin’s description of Camus’s “meditative progress” emphasizes that Camus 
possessed the endurance and clarity to resist the temptations of nihilism.  The use of art or myth 
aided Camus in this process.  According to Voegelin, the “medium of myth” afforded Camus 
“the strength that sustained him for decades in the tension of his meditation and enabled him to 
see through the perversion of revolt and to overcome it.”55  Because the tumultuous “nonsense” 
of the present was disheartening for Camus, Voegelin argues that Camus chose myth as a 
“home” from which to create unity and meaning symbolically.56  By emphasizing the “medium 
of myth” as the vehicle for Camus’s meditation, Voegelin seems to suggest that Camus’s role as 
an artist was essential to his arrival at an appreciation of the “here and now of existence.”  
Camus’s meditation, therefore, was not strictly philosophical, but aesthetic in nature.  There is 
evidence in Camus’s writing that he was exasperated by the “nonsense” of his time.  In the essay, 
“The Minotaur,” he wrote, “There are no more deserts.  There are no more islands.  Yet there is 
need for them.  In order to understand the world, one has to turn away from it on occasion; in 
order to serve men better, one has to hold them at a distance for a time.”57  Considering the 
necessity of a fictional “home” for Camus’s meditation, it is safe to assume that he developed 
and nurtured life affirming values most successfully in his fictional works.   
                                                 
55Ibid. 
56Ibid. 
57Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 157. 
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Method of Analysis 
As stated previously, the focus of this study is to identify the foundation and development 
of Camus’s values.  The answer to the question is very elusive in Camus’s work and he never 
directly addressed the development of values in a world characterized by absurdity.  However, 
Voegelin’s short but evocative interpretation of Camus provides the framework for a meditation 
that may have served as a foundation or understanding of Camus’s values.  In an attempt to 
locate the origin of Camus’s values, the three stage meditation of the periagoge, which Voegelin 
describes, will be elaborated upon and critically examined.  A close examination of this 
meditation with comparisons to Camus’s own works should help to illuminate the search for 
Camus’s development of values.  Further, if Camus conducted this meditation within the 
medium of myth, as Voegelin argues, the periagoge should be reflective of the major themes in 
Camus’s most mature fictional work, The Plague.  
The various stages of the periagoge are surely evident throughout most of Camus’s 
writing, but for the purpose of this research, the focus will be upon how the periagoge is 
contained and developed within The Plague.  However, this focus will not be exclusively on The 
Plague.  Other works will be treated as essential for clarifying any issues that are developed in 
the stages of the meditation.  The following discussion is meant to outline the three stages of the 
periagoge as they are contained within The Plague.  
Absurdity, the first phase of Voegelin’s structural taxonomy, is perhaps the most obvious 
theme in the novel.  The experience of absurdity, Voegelin argues, allowed Camus to reach the 
depths of reality from which the ascent can begin.  Mimicking the experience of absurdity, 
Camus presented the entire town of Oran under quarantine, with all citizens trapped among those 
infected with a deadly microbe.  Dr. Rieux, the narrator, summarizes the nature of this setting 
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when denying leave to the foreign journalist, Rambert.  “Oh, I know it’s an absurd situation, but 
we’re all involved in it, and we’ve got to accept it as it is.”58  Trapped inside the walls of the city 
and exposed to a deadly contagion, the citizens of Oran fully experience the depths of reality in 
an absurd setting. 
Camus’s notion of absurdity, originally developed in The Myth of Sisyphus, depicts the 
human being alienated from his own life because of the incoherence of the world.59  This 
alienation, which Camus referred to as “exile,” is present in The Plague also: “Thus the first 
thing the plague brought to our town was exile.”60  He later described exile as the “sensation of a 
void within” and an “irrational longing” to escape the situation.61  This void spurred by irrational 
longing is a result of man being denied that for which he hopes.  “Hostile to the past, impatient 
of the present, cheated of the future, we were much like those whom men’s justice, or hatred, 
forces to live behind bars.”62  
In the collection of short stories, Exile and the Kingdom, Camus experimented further 
with the feeling of exile as a result of absurdity.  Like the citizens of Oran, the characters in these 
stories experience a type of emptiness because they cannot fulfill their hopes in a world that is 
silent to those hopes.  Therefore, the kingdom, which represents the life for which one hopes, is 
eternally elusive; and it exists only in the minds of nostalgic men.  The setting of The Plague 
                                                 
58Albert Camus, The Plague, trans, Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage International, 
1991), p. 86. 
59Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 6.  
60Camus, The Plague, p. 71. 
61Ibid. 
62Ibid, p. 73.  
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represents the silence of the world because the citizens of Oran are faced with the prospect of 
death and isolation when their hope is for life and companionship.  
As one can see, the experience of absurdity is prevalent in Camus’s works, and it is 
portrayed expertly in The Plague.  Voegelin suggests that this experience is essential for 
reaching the depths of reality from which one can begin the ascent towards the light.  Further 
examination of this absurd experience with cross references to The Myth of Sisyphus will reveal 
the manner in which this experience can be instructive for the development of values.  
Voegelin truly admires Camus’s development in the second phase of the ascent, 
rebellion.  Camus’s meditation is instructive during this phase because he was able to withstand 
“second realities.”63  A common example of a second reality is the idea of historical rationality, 
conceived by Hegel, which Camus rejected as a source of values commenting that it can only be 
a source of nihilism.64  Abusurdism, Camus argued, has “wiped the slate clean” leaving behind 
only the “blind impulse to demand order in the midst of chaos, and unity in the very heart of the 
ephemeral.”65  Camus presented rebellion as a natural reaction to man’s absurd condition, but he 
acknowledged in The Rebel that rebellion must affirm limits or else negate “all of existence and 
all of human nature.”66  The metaphysical desire for unity requires that man confront the world 
with protest, but in that protest, man must not destroy the values for which he fights.  This theory 
of limits was an attempt by Camus to reveal the contradictions in destructive revolutions.  
                                                 
63Voegelin, Anamnesis, p. 369.  
64Camus, The Rebel, p. 249. 
65Ibid, p. 10. 
66Ibid, p. 251. 
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Confronted with a chaotic and irrational existence, the citizens of Oran feel the impulse 
to rebel insofar as they abhor their own condition.  “No longer were there individual destinies; 
only a collective destiny, made of plague and the emotions shared by all.  Strongest of these 
emotions was the sense of exile and deprivation, with the crosscurrents of revolt and fear set up 
by these.”67  Perhaps one of the most evocative episodes in the novel is the death of a child.  Dr. 
Rieux feels that the pain inflicted on the magistrate’s innocent child is “an abominable thing.”68 
Rieux, like Doestoevsky’s Ivan Karamozov, refuses to believe in a scheme of existence where 
children are made to suffer.  Rieux comments to the priest, Father Paneloux, “And there are 
times when the only feeling I have is one of mad revolt.”69
This impulse toward “mad revolt” is present in The Plague, but Camus is careful to 
suggest that this revolt must be limited to the realm of possibility.  For example, Jean Tarrou, a 
visitor to Oran, considers capital punishment to be a plague on mankind.  However, when he 
joined a revolutionary sect in Hungary to abolish the death penalty, he found himself complicit in 
murder for the sake of his principles.70  Tarrou quickly realized that his revolutionary comrades 
were quite willing to dispense capital punishment when it suited their idealistic ends; on the 
other hand, when helping Rieux in his medical duties, Tarrou experienced the humble 
satisfaction of rebellion.  
                                                 
67Camus, The Plague, p. 167.  
68Ibid, p. 214.  
69Ibid, p. 218. 
70Ibid, p. 251.  
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The essential thing was to save the greatest possible number of persons from dying and 
becoming doomed to separation.  And to do this there was only one resource: to fight the 
plague.  There was nothing admirable about this attitude; it was merely logical.71
  
In this juxtaposition, Camus revealed that saving the entire human race from evil or injustice is 
impossible.  Any doctrine that asserts the possibility of such a quest would be characteristic of 
what Voegelin calls “second realities.”  The narrator, Rieux, comments upon the futility of vain 
hopes.  “But for those others who aspired beyond the human individual toward something they 
could not even imagine, there had been no answer.”72
 Thus, The Plague nicely encapsulates the first and second stage of the periagoge as 
Voegelin describes it.  The depths of reality are reached in the experience of absurdity that arises 
from being trapped in a plague-ridden town.  From this depth, some characters rebel against the 
irrational nature of the situation, but the characters that limit their hopes to the immediacy of 
individuals, rather than abstract principles, experience a type of fulfillment at the conclusion of 
the novel.  
 The fulfillment experienced by the characters in the novel, closely resembles Voegelin’s 
description of the third and final phase of the periagoge.  Voegelin is somewhat vague in his 
delineation of this final phase.  Camus, he writes, wished to “gain the freedom to create” in this 
phase, but his “untimely death” interrupted this progress.73  Nevertheless, Voegelin speculates 
that this final phase was directing Camus towards “[n]ot morality, but fulfillment” as a result of a 
“new insight gained through love.”74  Voegelin even argues that Camus’s meditative progress 
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73Voegelin, Anamnesis, pp. 369-70.  
74Ibid, p. 371.  
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led him to a vague understanding of human nature.  This human nature is not formal in nature, 
but rather, it is characterized by “an active life ordered by a loving tension toward the divine 
ground.”75  It is indeed in this final phase that the “existential mood” of the meditation changes 
from “mean spiritedness” to “spiritual joyfulness” as “the joy of the here and now of existence 
begins stirring again.”76  
 If Voegelin is correct to argue that the “existential mood” of Camus’s meditation changed 
in the final phase, the nature of this change will be essential for an understanding of Camus’s 
development of values beyond rebellion.  Moreover, this change in mood appears to be evident 
in The Plague.  As the novel progresses, Dr. Rieux and the visitor Tarrou work assiduously in 
sanitation squads making medical rounds in an effort that can be characterized as a struggle or 
rebellion against the conditions of the plague.  In the midst of this struggle, the two find respite 
in the experience and appreciation of friendship.  Camus artistically portrayed the ephemeral 
happiness of friendship. 
Rieux could feel under his hand the weather-worn visage of the rocks, and a strange 
happiness possessed him.  Turning to Tarrou, he caught a glimpse on his friend’s face of 
the same happiness that forgot nothing, not even murder. . . .  For some minutes they 
swam side by side, with the same zest, in the same rhythm, isolated from the world, at 
least free of the town and of the plague. . . .  Neither had said a word, but they were 
conscious of being perfectly at one, and the memory of this night would be cherished by 
them both.77   
 
Out of an absurd situation in which the only perceivable instinct is to rebel, some of the 
townspeople find joy in solidarity.  This joy comes from the acknowledgement that man is to be 
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77Camus, The Plague, pp. 256-57.  
 24
valued presently.  Camus revealed at the end of the novel that the purpose of the narrative is to 
affirm the value of man.  
Dr. Rieux resolved to compile this chronicle, so that he should not be one of those who 
hold their peace but should bear witness in favor of those plague-stricken people; so that 
some memorial of the injustice and outrage done them might endure; and to state quite 
simply what we learn in time of pestilence: that there are more things to admire in men 
than to despise.78    
 
 Because of the complex development of characters and situations in The Plague, this 
novel encompasses Voegelin’s construction of Camus’s meditation most fully.  The Plague is the 
only work in which Camus traversed the entire meditative journey from recognition of absurdity 
through rebellion, and finally, to fulfillment and affirmation of the here and now.  The intention 
of this research project is to follow the Voegelinian progression in some considerable detail as it 
is presented in The Plague in an attempt to identify the source of Camus’s values and how he 
developed them and to evaluate the usefulness of this progression as a guide to understanding 
Camus.  Before undertaking this analysis, however, it is necessary to establish the importance of 
fiction or myth as the site of Camus’s philosophical meditation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78Ibid, p. 308.  
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CHAPTER 2.  MYTHIC FOUNDATIONS  
Introduction 
Camus considered himself more of an artist than a philosopher.  This does not mean that 
he had no concern for philosophy but that his approach to philosophy more closely approximated 
artistic creation than traditional philosophical writing.  Voegelin suggests that Camus’s literary 
abilities allowed him to recreate instances of illumination that speak to the experiential core.  
Artistic creation allowed Camus to enliven his philosophical concepts by communicating on a 
deeper level that philosophical description cannot access.  The symbolization of these 
illuminating experiences is of primary importance to the project at hand; therefore, this chapter is 
designed to highlight the importance of myth as a tool for philosophical inquiry.   
Aesthetic Style and “The Medium of Myth” 
Voegelin admires Camus’s three-stage meditation “as a model and guide in the analysis 
of existence that nowadays everyone who, in opposition to the times, seeks to regain his reality 
as a man must undertake.”79  This “analysis of existence” is difficult.  If it were easy for a man to 
“regain his reality,” as Voegelin puts it, he would not have to turn to Camus for instruction.  
This, then, raises the question: What is it about Camus’s meditation that provides insight and 
stability to this “analysis of existence?”  The answer is that Camus relied on myth as a dwelling 
for his philosophical reflections.  Voegelin wrote: 
Let us formulate the question concretely: From where did Albert Camus, whose work 
was mentioned earlier, get the strength that sustained him for decades in the tension of his 
meditation and enabled him to see through the perversion of revolt and to overcome it?  
For Camus this strength derives from myth.80
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The artist, wielding the tool of mythic creation, can create a new world in which the reader can 
participate.  Voegelin argues that Camus used artistic creation in this manner as an escape from 
the troubling atmosphere of the present.  “The ‘nonsense’ [Blödsinn] of the time is no home for a 
man; he must choose a home in which he, alive, will again create a home in the dimension of 
time.  Camus chooses myth.”81  For Voegelin, myth itself serves as a foundation or “home” for 
Camus.  Indeed, Voegelin describes Camus’s meditation as “[t]he quest for the ‘terre fidèle’ 
[faithful land].”82   
 Camus’s own writings reveal that Voegelin was correct to identify fictional creation as a 
comfortable “home” for Camus’s meditation.  In 1958, Camus decided to republish a collection 
of essays that he wrote when he was only twenty-two.  The collection was entitled “The Wrong 
Side and the Right Side.”  In the preface to this republished collection, Camus reflected on the 
meaning of his life’s work: “[A] man’s work is nothing but this slow trek to rediscover, through 
the detours of art, those two or three great and simple images in whose presence his heart first 
opened.”83  Camus was referring here to illumination.  Moreover, Camus revealed that such 
illumination is triggered by images, and the artist or fictional writer has the ability to recreate or 
rediscover these images.  The philosopher, placing emphasis on explanation, encounters 
difficulty in rediscovering instances of illumination.  Camus considered the task of the artist and 
the philosopher to be similar; although, the artist has a distinct advantage.   
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The philosopher, even if he is Kant, is a creator.  He has his characters, his symbols, and 
his secret action.  He has his plot endings.  On the contrary, the lead taken by the novel 
over poetry and the essay merely represents a greater intellectualization of the art.84
 
Both philosophers and artists are creators, and they both aspire to create a world that in some 
way satisfies the human nostalgia for unity and purpose.  In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus argued 
that the act of creation is more common than one often acknowledges:  
To think is first of all to create a world (or to limit one’s own, which comes to the same 
thing).  It is starting out from the basic disagreement that separates man from his 
experience in order to find a common ground according to one’s nostalgia, a universe 
hedged with reasons or lighted up with analogies but which in any case, gives an 
opportunity to rescind the unbearable divorce.85
 
Holding that both philosophical and fictional writing, are forms of creation, Camus 
considered the fictional writer to be better equipped to handle images.  He wrote, “Feelings and 
images multiply a philosophy by ten.”86  Images are evocative of experiences, and they are more 
participatory than philosophical essays.  Perhaps this is why Camus reinforced The Myth of 
Sisyphus with the tale of Sisyphus’s absurd punishment and The Rebel with the myth of 
Prometheus.  Images themselves serve as a language that only the artist can properly translate to 
the reader.  Camus understood this from the very beginning of his career as this early entry in his 
Notebooks reveals: “People can think only in images.  If you want to be a philosopher write 
novels.”87
The ability of the novelist to reach an audience with profound philosophical and political 
insights relies ultimately on his or her aesthetic method.  John Krapp, mentioned earlier, argues 
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that Camus’s aesthetic approach in The Plague relies on his ability to present a dialogue and 
refrain from moralizing.  He writes, “The Plague illustrates less a thematic moral lesson than a 
paradigm for the way moral consciousness may be nourished aesthetically in the conflict 
between ethical voices.”88  Camus’s aesthetic approach allowed him to develop a form of moral 
consciousness that is based on the “intersubjective human experience” mentioned by David 
Sprintzen.89  Such a collective presentation of opposing viewpoints is reflective of the true 
existential condition of human beings in which they must derive ethical instruction from these 
competing viewpoints.  Krapp describes Camus’s approach as maintaining a careful balance 
between ethical and aesthetic concerns.  “The work’s ethical and aesthetic dimensions must not 
exceed one another; rather, they must mask one another so that what appears to the reader is a 
series of tensions among characters from which the structural mechanism of moral education can 
be elucidated.”90  Camus’s reluctance to sermonize or spout forth moral principles is the element 
of Camus’s aesthetic approach that Krapp truly admires.  David Walsh, employing Camus as an 
example of a thinker who was troubled by the adverse effects of modernity, similarly praises the 
novel as a vehicle to examine the “tensions” present in reality.  His description is worth quoting 
at length: 
When all doctrines and principles have become opaque, then it becomes a matter of 
necessity to return to the sources in experience on which all truth ultimately rests. . . .  
This is why the thinkers who have worked through the crisis of modernity prefer to 
communicate their insights through novels.  In contrast to discursive arguments, the 
medium of fictional literature allows a more immediate presentation of the experience.  
This is also the orientation that has guided their approach to the medium.  All three 
novelists whom we have examined, Dostoevsky, Solzhenitsyn, and Camus regard the 
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novel as a means of exploring the directional tensions of reality, rather than as a vehicle 
for expounding the author’s own monological point of view.91
 
Both Walsh and Krapp agree that the success of Camus as a philosophical novelist rests upon his 
restraint.  Indeed, this restraint is an aesthetic device that Camus employed to ground his fiction 
in the experience of competing ethical claims. 
 Cecil Eubanks and Peter Petrakis go further in their development of Camus’s aesthetic 
theory than Krapp.  They argue that Camus’s aesthetic theory of politics relies on an 
understanding of symbols.  They define symbols as such: 
 Symbols are evocative signs capable of illuminating human experience, both individual  
and communal, and giving to those experiences meaning and significance.  Necessarily  
ambiguous and containing elements of the nonrational, symbols act as meditations  
between the so-called empirical world and the world of imagination.  They are not litteral  
descriptions of that empirical reality, nor are they simply flights of fancy.  Symbols are  
both bound and free.92      
 
The last sentence succinctly elucidates the special character of symbols as “bound and free.”  
They are bound to our immediate experiences insofar as they tap into the shared experiences of 
mankind.  This theory of the equivalence of experience was originally put forth by Voegelin.93  
Symbols are also free because the artist can use symbols imaginatively in order to create a new 
world in which to explore political realities.  Such a new world is often arranged in a way that 
satisfies the human nostalgia for clarity and unity.  Sprintzen argues that great art presents us 
with “a perfect world—an embodied version of a metaphysical response in which natural 
experience is reconstructed so as to speak to that exigence ontologique.  We encounter in the 
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work a unified world in which our struggles take the form of destiny.”94  Such a unified world is 
created by paying careful attention to style. 
 Camus’s conception of style is closely linked to his concept of absurdity, and this linkage 
necessitates limits of artistic creation.  Novels cannot offer meaning that eliminates the absurdity 
of existence.  “The absurd work requires an artist conscious of these limitations and an art in 
which the concrete signifies more than itself.  It cannot be an end, the meaning, and the 
consolation of life.”95  In other words, art is meant to create a world that is reflective of the 
absurd, not to change the world in such a way that is ceases to be absurd.  Eubanks and Petrakis 
argue that Camus’s style reflects the Greek notion of “sophron” or “moderation.”  Style requires 
a delicate balance.  “In order to satisfy the desire for unity without misguiding readers into a 
belief that reality itself is or can be somehow changed, the novel must conform to the demands of 
style.”96  Camus’s style of self restraint infused his novels with an evocative quality that “speaks 
to our deepest existential needs.”97  
 The ability of art and especially the novel to satisfy the human demand for unity while 
symbolizing concrete experience provides an ideal site for exploring politics in a symbolic 
manner.  Eubanks and Petrakis write, “Camus insists, then, that the recovery of the fundamental 
symbols of politics resides in the narrative, specifically the philosophical novel, where the story 
is marked and human experience is acknowledged in all of its temporal character.”98  Any 
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political insight must be grounded in the equivalent human experience of absurdity.  
Philosophical novelists such as Camus symbolize the absurd nature of existence while at the 
same time suggesting that there is hope for mankind.  The intention of this approach is to foster a 
new political understanding by confronting the reader with a world that is somewhat familiar, yet 
full of new possibilities.   
 In summary, Camus considered the novel as the most appropriate site for philosophical 
reflection.  In the novel, the reader encounters not only ideas, but images that symbolize the 
shared experience of mankind.  Paying careful attention to style, the novelist can also present the 
reader with a world that satisfies the human nostalgia for unity and clarity without compromising 
the existence of the absurd.  Obviously, Camus attributed overwhelming importance to the novel 
as a vehicle for of philosophical expression; therefore, it is safe to assume that his own novels 
were an essential component of his philosophical development.  The aspiration of this research is 
to identify the traces of Camus’s meditative ascent in his most mature novel, The Plague.   
The Meditative Ascent 
 Voegelin describes Camus’s meditation as a periagoge, an awareness of suffering that 
leads one to turn away from the depths of existence and begin the ascent towards the light.99  
This is the journey of the philosopher in Plato’s allegory of the cave.  As discussed above, 
Voegelin divides the ascent into three stages, absurdity, rebellion, and fulfillment, the final stage 
having been cut short because of Camus’s unexpected death in a car accident.100  Following the 
stages of this ascent, this project will proceed with one section dedicated to each of the three 
stages.  Each section will begin with a detailed discussion of the respective phase as Camus 
                                                 
99Voegelin, Anamnesis, p. 369. 
100Ibid, pp. 369-70. 
 32
conceptualized it.  After clarifying the conceptual characteristics of the respective phase, the 
ways in which Camus explored the concept aesthetically and symbolically in his fictional works 
will be examined.   
The Plague most fully encapsulates all three stages of the ascent.  Petrakis and Eubanks 
noticed as much when commenting upon Voegelin’s interpretation of Camus.  “Camus’[s] 
reconstruction, particularly as a prototype for a politics of foundations without foundationalism, 
is perhaps best portrayed in his novel The Plague, where Dr. Rieux, its indefatigable hero, is a 
symbol for authentic political action.”101  The following analysis will attempt to follow the 
meditative ascent as it is presented in The Plague in order to identify these political foundations 
or values. 
Before embarking upon the analysis of Camus’s meditative ascent, it is necessary to issue 
some important preliminary qualifications concerning the structure of Voegelin’s taxonomy.  
Voegelin’s taxonomy of Camus’s meditation is conceptually linear and distinct.  His description 
of the meditation implies that Camus moved through the first two stages, absurdity and rebellion, 
on a journey to the final destination of fulfillment.  This taxonomy, although it is useful for 
examining Camus’s work, is artificially distinct and linear.  As Camus shows in The Plague, 
absurdity cannot be abandoned; the rats will always come out again.  Therefore, a linear 
progression from the absurd is problematic because absurdity continuously defines the human 
condition.  Similarly, rebellion against the absurd will be ongoing, and fulfillment will wax and 
wane.  It is also likely that Camus did not experience these three stages of the meditation in 
distinct periods, but rather simultaneously.  Of course, treating the stages of the meditative 
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journey in a simultaneous manner would diminish the usefulness of Voegelin’s taxonomy.  For 
these reasons, the taxonomic progression described by Voegelin will be used as a guide for 
examining the foundations of Camus’s values, but the linear and distinct character of the 
progression will also be treated with skepticism.    
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CHAPTER 3.  ABSURDITY 
 
Introduction 
 
 The first phase in Camus’s meditative ascent, as described by Voegelin, is the experience 
of absurdity.  Indeed, the concept of absurdity was one of Camus’s most identifiable 
philosophical contributions, earning him considerable praise after the publication of The 
Stranger and The Myth of Sisyphus.  The aim of this chapter is to describe Camus’s concept of 
absurdity and to establish the significance of this concept for Camus’s development of values in 
the meditative ascent.  When taken in the context of the periagoge, the experience of absurdity 
mimics what Voegelin calls “the depths of the turning around.”102  For Camus, the absurd was 
indicative of a specific awareness of the human plight, and this awareness would guide his 
philosophical and fictional writing for the rest of his life.   
 The initial focus of this chapter is the conceptual discussion of the absurd in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, the philosophical essay in which Camus established the concept of absurdity.  Then, 
the discussion turns to the symbolic or aesthetic representation of the absurd in Camus’s fiction.  
Both the Sisyphus myth and The Stranger provide vivid examples of the individual facing the 
absurd, and these individual representations are key components in the development of an absurd 
consciousness.  Following these examples, the focus shifts to The Plague in which the 
experience of absurdity becomes a collective reality shared by all inhabitants in the quarantined 
town of Oran.  The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the absurd and some thoughts on 
its significance as the first phase in the meditative ascent.  
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The Concept of Absurdity 
In his first major philosophical essay, The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus developed the notion 
of the absurd to serve as the existential condition of man.  This notion was implicitly recognized 
by existentialist writers whom Camus admired, but he thought the absurd was a broader principle 
that underpinned certain existential dilemmas.  For example, he commented in The Myth of 
Sisyphus that Sartre’s concept of nausea, Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety, and even Husserl’s 
method of phenomenology were symptoms of the absurd.103  So, what exactly is absurdity, and 
what is its source?  Put simply, the absurd is the existential condition that arises from the 
confrontation between the nostalgic human being and the coldly indifferent world in which he or 
she lives.  In Camus’s own words, it is “the metaphysical state of the conscious man.”104  Human 
beings desire order, purpose and happiness in their lives, and the world provides none of these—
at least not in any permanent fashion.  
To clarify this concept of absurdity, it is necessary to point out that absurdity itself is a 
characteristic of neither the human being nor the world solely, but of their interaction.  
Establishing the concept of absurdity as a first principle, Camus wrote, 
I said that the world is absurd, but I was too hasty.  This world in itself is not reasonable, 
that is all that can be said.  But what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational 
[world] and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart.  The 
absurd depends as much on man as on the world.  For the moment it is all that links them 
together.  It binds them one to the other as only hatred can weld two creatures together.  
This is all I can discern clearly in this measureless universe where my adventures take 
place.105    
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Obviously, Camus attributed great significance to the notion of absurdity.  It is not merely one 
characteristic of the human interaction with the outside world, but the defining characteristic.   
Camus saw the absurd as one of three essential components that constitute the “drama” of 
existence.106  Absurdity is born out of the confrontation between the two other components: the 
“human nostalgia” for unity or clarity and the “unreasonable silence of the world.”107  Therefore, 
the concept of absurdity depends upon the qualification of the two other components.  If humans 
did not possess a nostalgia for unity, the so-called “unreasonable silence of the world” would not 
seem to be absurd.  Likewise, if the events of the world did represent some reasonable unity of 
purpose, the nostalgic human being would not find existence to be absurd.  Camus reinforced the 
existence of the absurd by showing that the human nostalgia for unity and clarity is real, and by 
arguing that the unreasonable world will never satisfy this nostalgia.  
Some have argued that Camus borrowed his concept of “human nostalgia” from the Neo-
Platonist, Plotinus.108  It is likely that Plotinus influenced his thinking, but Camus also based this 
nostalgia on his own personal experiences, using a method very similar to Cartesian doubt.  He 
wrote, “I can negate everything of that part of me that lives on vague nostalgias, except this 
desire for unity, this longing to solve, this need for clarity and cohesion.”109  Indeed, this very act 
of negating all uncertainties is itself characteristic of the human desire for understanding.  Camus 
identified reason as the force that drives the human nostalgia for understanding.  This longing for 
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clarity, known as reason, is inevitably directed towards the world in which one lives in an 
attempt to find some meaning or purpose.  Camus argued that the rational pursuit of 
understanding would always take place on a human scale: “Understanding the world for a man is 
reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal.”110  Reason demands, not only the existence 
of a unified meaning of reality, but also that this unified meaning be comprehensible in human 
terms.  
Could there be a unified purpose of events or a deeper meaning of existence?  Camus’s 
argument was not ontological in this respect, but epistemological: “I don’t know whether this 
world has any meaning that transcends it.  But I know that I do not know that meaning and that it 
is impossible for me just now to know it.”111  Rejecting any attempt to attribute meaning to the 
world from outside the realm of human experience, Camus’s methodical doubt led him to “two 
certainties—[the] appetite for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility of reducing this 
world to a rational and reasonable principle.”112  Camus did not presume that reason is infallible, 
and actually, the limited nature of human reason contributes to the existence of the absurd.  
Neither did he presume that the world is devoid of transcendent meaning, but that human beings 
cannot understand such a notion, and therefore, it cannot mitigate the uncertainty that 
precipitates the existence of the absurd in the present sense. 
The epistemological limit of human reason that Camus recognizes is an essential 
component of the absurd.  The ability to recognize these limits based on practical experience is 
called lucidity.  Absurdist consciousness requires reason as well as lucidity.  Camus wrote, “The 
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absurd is lucid reasoning noticing its limits.”113  The faculty of lucidity grounds man in his own 
experience preventing him from abandoning that experience in the name of false understanding.  
“If there is an absurd, it is in man’s universe.  The moment the notion transforms itself into 
eternity’s springboard, it ceases to be linked to human lucidity.”114  Reason tempts, and lucidity 
restrains.  Only the lucid individual will understand the limits of reason and recognize the 
divorce between the desire to understand and the inability to understand as a fundamental aspect 
of the absurd.  From Camus’s description, reason is the defining quality that sets man apart from 
the world, which is utterly irrational.  “This ridiculous reason is what sets me in opposition to all 
creation.”115
Much of Camus’s writing in The Myth of Sisyphus is dedicated to establishing a 
conscious recognition of the absurd, but consciousness of the absurd was merely a beginning.  
The purpose of The Myth of Sisyphus was to determine whether suicide is a logical reaction to 
this absurdist consciousness.  Camus concluded that suicide is an illogical reaction for the man 
who realizes his absurd fate.  “Living an experience, a particular fate, is accepting it fully.  Now, 
no one will live this fate knowing it to be absurd, unless he does everything to keep before him 
that absurd brought to light by that consciousness.  Negating one of the terms of the opposition 
on which he lives amounts to escaping it.”116  The absurdity of life is the inevitability of death; 
therefore, suicide amounts to the complete acceptance of the absurd outcome, death.  The absurd 
man can recognize the factual existence of death through lucidity, but he cannot accept the 
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outcome.  “In its way, suicide settles the absurd.  It engulfs the absurd in the same death.  But I 
know that in order to keep alive, the absurd cannot be settled.  It [the absurd] escapes suicide to 
the extent that it is simultaneously awareness and rejection of death.”117  Thus, Camus 
recognized resistance or revolt as the logical outcome of absurdist reasoning.  “That revolt is the 
certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that ought to accompany it.”118  
In summary, the existence of the absurd allows three possibilities for the human being.  
One can reject the existence of the absurd through a lapse in lucidity or through a “leap” in 
reason.  Such a leap is an “escape” in which “[t]he struggle is eluded” by imposing some 
meaning upon reality that originates outside of the realm of lived experience.119  Camus insisted 
that lucidity must inform man of the limits of reason so that he may avoid leaps and retain his 
absurdist consciousness.  Second, one may recognize the existence of the absurd and fully accept 
it.  Suicide falls under this category, and it has already been mentioned that this is an illogical 
reaction to the absurd.  It is indeed paradoxical to think of a situation that is both acceptable and 
absurd at the same time.  Therefore, the very recognition of the absurd implies that one rejects 
one’s fate—although one is aware of it.  This relates to the final possibility of resistance.  
Resistance is the logical reaction to an absurd situation, and for Camus this is the essence of life.  
He defined the individual experience as one of “permanent revolution”120  Life itself is a 
permanent revolution against death, and the appreciation of life as a struggle is a defining 
attribute of absurdist consciousness.  The following section, focusing on Camus’s two individual 
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absurdist heroes, shows that the love of life as a struggle against the absurd is a powerful symbol 
of absurdist consciousness. 
Sisyphus and Meursault—Individuals Facing the Absurd 
 Camus concluded his philosophical essay on the absurd, The Myth of Sisyphus, with an 
analysis of the god-defying mortal, Sisyphus.  For many reasons, Sisyphus epitomizes absurdity.  
He stole water from the gods and gave it to the mortals, placed death in chains, and refused to 
return to the underworld after Pluto granted him a brief return to the Earth.  For these offenses, 
Mercury seized him and forced him back into the underworld where he would endure the never-
ending task of pushing an enormous boulder to the top of a mountain from where it would fall 
back down again.  Camus considered Sisyphus to be “the absurd hero” because of his desire for 
life and his inescapable punishment. “His scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion 
for life won him that penalty in which the whole being is exerted toward accomplishing 
nothing.”121
 This is not all that is to be said of Sisyphus.  Camus was most interested in what 
happened to Sisyphus in the underworld—precisely where the story ends.  Camus thought there 
was more to be gained from this myth. He wrote, “Myths are made for imagination to breathe 
life into them.”122  Camus imagined Sisyphus rolling the stone up the incline and finally reaching 
the summit.  From there, the stone rolls back down the hill, and Sisyphus returns to the bottom.  
During this return, Sisyphus experiences what Camus called his “hour of consciousness” in 
which he fully realizes his absurd condition.  “Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and 
rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of in his 
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descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory.”123  
Sisyphus struggles, not to escape his punishment, but to defy it.  He undertakes this struggle, 
equivalent to the desire for life or happiness, with the knowledge that it will be everlasting, 
affording him only brief moments of reflection.  Camus saw in Sisyphus a lesson about the 
desire for life and the struggle to preserve it.  He wrote, “But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity 
that negates the gods and raises rocks. . . .  The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill 
a man’s heart.  One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”124  
 In Sisyphus, Camus found the perfect symbolic representation of the absurd man.  He 
defies the gods in the name of life, and his punishment resembles the struggle against death that 
all human beings must endure.  In The Stranger, Camus presents the absurd in the symbol of a 
death sentence.  In his rejection of suicide as a viable solution to absurdity, Camus wrote, “The 
contrary of suicide, in fact, is the man condemned to death.”125  This statement was meant to 
illustrate the radically different attitude in these two subjects.  The man intending to commit 
suicide rushes toward death while he is still able to live; the man condemned to death 
experiences an extreme passion to live although death is rushing towards him.  In the latter 
manner, the hero in Camus’s novel The Stranger serves as a magnification of the absurd 
individual.  Meursault, the narrator, is condemned to death for the crime of killing an Arab.  
After receiving this sentence, his every impulse is directed towards escaping.  In other words, his 
death sentence reinvigorates his instinct to live.  “What really counted was the possibility of 
escape, a leap to freedom, out of the implacable ritual, a wild run for it that would give whatever 
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chance for hope there was.”126  Ironically, the closer Meursault gets to his death, the stronger his 
desire to live.  “So close to death, Maman must have felt free then and ready to live it all again                      
. . . .  And I felt ready to live it all again too.”127   
 Meursault, like Sisyphus, displays a desire to live that is an essential character of 
absurdist consciousness.  However, Meursault’s resistance to death is not absolute, and this is an 
essential feature of his significance.  Camus saw to it that Meursault is sentenced by the jury for 
reasons other than his actual crime.  He is primarily judged by objective assessments of his 
character such as his adulterous affair and the fact that he did not express emotion on the day of 
his mother’s funeral.  Mersault is condemned to death because he appears to be cold-hearted and 
unremorseful.  In fact, he was merely sleepy on the day of his mother’s funeral, and that was the 
reason for his apparent indifference.  When his attorney beseeches him to lie about his actual 
feelings on that day, he refuses.  Meursault loves life, but he refuses to lie in order to save his 
own life.  As Camus stated in the preface, “the hero of my book is condemned because he does 
not play the game.”128  Meursault is a rebel, embroiled in the struggle just as all men are, but 
Meursault’s struggle represents so much more than the resistance to death.  Meursault’s struggle 
is against the world in all of its absurd manifestations.  He fights against inauthenticity, 
judgment, and social conformity showing that the absurdity of man’s condition is quite prolific 
and not limited to the inevitability of death.   
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In Meursault’s unfortunate case, the absurdity of his life leads him to a premature death.  
Camus did not cease to grapple with the implications of death even after he had completed The 
Stranger.  Death, man’s final destination, is the most identifiable manifestation of the absurd.  
Camus revisited this theme in The Plague when his focus shifted from the individual experience 
of absurdity to the collective or communal experience.  The initial pages of the novel reveal the 
elements of importance: “Perhaps the easiest way of making a town’s acquaintance is to 
ascertain how the people in it work, how they love, and how they die.”129    
Pathos and The Plague 
 It has already been mentioned that the unique contribution of The Plague to the notion of 
absurdity lies in its presentation of the absurd as a collective experience.  In The Plague, 
Meursault’s struggle is shared by all.  The symbol of shared suffering, or pathos, a major theme 
in the novel, is essential to forming a communal understanding of the absurd.  Camus employed 
this symbol expertly in The Plague, and he showed that the equivalent experience of pathos can 
induce a renewed form of lucidity.  Eric Voegelin describes pathos as a “deeper level” of 
communication in which all men are met on an equal plane.   
Pathos is what men have in common, however variable it may be in its aspects and 
intensities.  Pathos designates a passive experience, not an action; it is what happens to 
man, what he suffers, what befalls him fatefully and what touches him in his existential 
core―as for instance the experience of Eros (481c-d).  In their exposure to pathos all 
men are equal, though they may differ widely in the manner in which they come to grips 
with it and build their experience into their lives. . . .  The community of pathos is the 
basis of communication.  Behind the hardened, intellectually supported attitudes which 
separate men, lie the pathema which bind them together.  However false and grotesque 
the intellectual position may be, the pathos at the core has the truth of an immediate 
experience.  If one can penetrate to this core and reawaken in man the awareness of his 
conditio humana, communication in the existential sense becomes possible.130
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Voegelin points to the specific ability of pathos to provide an equivalent level of communication 
in which an awareness of the human condition is fostered.  This insight by Voegelin accounts for 
Camus’s success in representing the concept of absurdity in The Plague.  Camus reached his 
readers on this deeper level of communication by aesthetically employing the symbol of pathos 
and by creating a world that is both absurd and intelligible to the reader.   
Exile—An Individual and Collective Experience 
   The Plague is set in the town of Oran, a banal and bourgeois town that is quickly placed 
under quarantine after the outbreak of the plague.  This quarantine gives the town a prison-like 
atmosphere in which all citizens are ensnared.  The ensnarement combined with bleak future 
assessments creates an atmosphere of general alienation or exile.  Separation from loved ones is 
perhaps the most common form of exile.  Indeed, the narrator Dr. Bernard Rieux, completely 
embodies the sentiment of separation; shortly after the reader makes his acquaintance, Rieux sees 
his wife off to a “sanatorium in the mountains” for the treatment of her “long illness.”131  
Throughout the novel Rieux is separated from his wife, uncertain of her well-being; and near the 
end, he receives word that she has died.   
 Raymond Rambert is a second character who represents an individual experience of 
exile.  Rambert’s case is somewhat different from Rieux’s because Rambert, the French 
journalist, is trapped in the quarantined town of Oran when on an assignment.  Once the town 
gates are closed, Rambert pleads with the town authorities to allow him to leave Oran, but the 
precautions of the quarantine prohibit this.  “The gist of his argument was always the same: that 
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he was a stranger to our town and, that being so, his case deserved special consideration.”132  
Rambert’s argument reflects the sentiment of the nostalgic human being looking for a specialized 
type of justice.  The cruel reality, in an absurd universe, is that the world remains silent to these 
demands.  In The Plague, the town bureaucracy perfectly mimics this irrationally silent world.  
  Rambert’s existence in Oran as “a stranger” is compounded by the fact that he is 
separated from the woman he loves, and he is uncertain if he will be able to see her once more.  
In this sense, Dr. Rieux and Rambert are in very similar situations, but Rambert, not knowing of 
Rieux’s wife from whom he is separated, chastises Rieux for not taking “the case of people who 
are separated into account.”133  In fact, Rambert admits that love is of central importance to him: 
“The truth is I wasn’t brought into this world to write newspaper articles.  But it’s quite likely I 
was brought into the world to live with a woman.”134  Rambert is deprived of his supposed 
reason for living in the absurdity of the plague. 
 Rieux and Rambert witness the absurd in full force when they are parted from their loved 
ones, and originally, they suffer this longing individually.  However, Camus revealed in The 
Plague that absurdity is also a collective experience in which a communal consciousness of the 
absurd can be instructive.  At the beginning of Part II, once the existence of the plague is 
confirmed and the quarantine is enacted, the narrator describes the mentality of the town: 
From now on, it can be said that plague was the concern of all of us. . . .  Once the town 
gates were shut, every one of us realized that all, the narrator included, were, so to speak 
in the same boat, and each would have to adapt himself to the new conditions of life.  
Thus, for example, a feeling normally as individual as the ache of separation from those 
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one loves suddenly became a feeling in which all shared alike and—together with fear— 
the greatest affliction of the long period of exile that lay ahead.135  
 
It is difficult to mistake the symbolism contained in Camus’s phrase “in the same boat.”  As he 
revealed in The Myth of Sisyphus, absurdity (and consequentially, exile) is the existential 
condition of all human beings, although they do not often realize this.  Through fiction, Camus 
was able to create a more tangible representation of absurdity that clearly affects everyone, 
pestilence.   
 Camus clearly intended to present the sentiment of exile as a collective experience in The 
Plague.  Rieux comments that the feeling of exile, which is closely related to the human 
nostalgia for unity and understanding, was the first hardship that the plague brought to the town.  
“It was undoubtedly the feeling of exile—that sensation of a void within, which never left us, 
that irrational longing to hark back to the past or else to speed up the march of time, and those 
keen shafts of memory that stung like fire.”136  Indeed, by the beginning of Part III, the feeling of 
exile has fully solidified into a communal consciousness.  “No longer were there individual 
destinies; only a collective destiny, made of plague and the emotions shared by all.  Strongest of 
these emotions was the sense of exile and of deprivation, with all the crosscurrents of revolt and 
fear set up by these.”137
 When assessing the bleak “collective destiny” of Oran, one cannot ignore the added sense 
of exile for “strangers” like Rambert.  The townspeople ironically experience “exile in one’s own 
home,” but Rambert faces this destiny while being simultaneously exiled spatially from his own 
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home.138  These unfortunate souls, separated from loved ones and their actual home at the same 
time were “the most exiled.”139  Their longing was double as was the absurdity they had to 
endure.  However, there is a revealing phrase from The Myth of Sisyphus that epitomizes 
Rambert’s reaction: “There is thus a metaphysical honor in enduring the world’s absurdity.”140  
Rambert does endure the absurdity, and just like Meursault, he does so despite being offered a 
way out.  Rambert’s only escape is through the underhanded method of smuggling, a seemingly 
dishonest escape from the town.  However, when his escape is finally secured, he admits that he 
would be embarrassed to abandon the town in which, up until that moment, he had felt like a 
stranger.  He expresses this decision to Dr. Rieux, “Until now I always felt a stranger in this 
town, and that I’d no concern with you people.  But now that I’ve seen what I have seen, I know 
that I belong here whether I want it or not.  This business is everybody’s business.”141  This is 
Rambert’s moment of lucidity; his awakening coincides with a sense of solidarity.  
Awareness of the Absurd and the Desire to Understand 
 It is prudent here to remind the reader that this analysis of The Plague relates to 
Voegelin’s structural taxonomy of Camus’s meditation.  This meditation takes the form of a 
periagoge, or turning around.  The first stage of the meditation, absurdity, corresponds to the 
general theme of exile that Camus conveyed in The Plague.  This sentiment of exile allowed 
Camus the ability to reach the depths of existence from where he could begin the ascent.  In The 
Plague, the distress of the exiled triggers contemplation.  “And it was then that fear, and with 
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fear serious reflection, began.”142  Reflection, triggered by exile, allows one to recognize the 
existence of the absurd.  Recognition of the absurd then leads to the turning around and the 
beginning of the ascent.   
 The human faculty for reflection is consistent with Camus’s argument that human beings 
possess a nostalgia for unity or understanding.  The characters in The Plague display this 
nostalgia in many forms once the plague sets in, but according to the conditions of the absurd, 
this nostalgia cannot be satisfied.  Indeed, the force of nostalgia is so great that it causes the 
townspeople to deny that which they cannot understand.  “[T]hey disbelieved in pestilences.  A 
pestilence isn’t a thing made to man’s measure; therefore we tell ourselves that pestilence is a 
mere bogy of the mind, a bad dream that will pass away.”143  Because they cannot understand it, 
these people reject the absurd until it crashes on to them. 
 Once the town is quarantined and the plague has become a clearly identifiable reality, the 
characters struggle to find meaning behind the absurd state of events.  Many townspeople turn to 
Father Paneloux, “a learned and militant Jesuit.”144  Paneloux understands the plague as a sign of 
divine justice.  He preaches to the assembled congregation, “Calamity has come on you, my 
brethren, and, my brethren, you deserve it.”145  Unlike those who reject the plague, Paneloux 
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fully accepts it and even tells the congregation to “rejoice.”146  By his understanding, there is no 
need of struggle.  One need only pray “[a]nd God would see to the rest.”147
 Paneloux’s view of the plague is a “leap” because he appeals to a source outside of lived 
experience.  Camus insisted that one must ground reason in lucidity to avoid such leaps.  In The 
Plague, lucidity is a faculty that accompanies lessons learned from lived experience.  For 
example, Dr. Rieux’s occupation provides him with concrete examples of physical suffering, and 
therefore, he cannot fathom the possibility that this constitutes some form of justice.  Rieux 
comments to his friend Tarrou that, “the order of the world is shaped by death” while God 
remains silent.  When Tarrou asks Rieux who taught him this lesson, Rieux replies, 
“Suffering.”148   
 Paneloux and Rieux have radically different understandings of the world and of the 
plague.  Paneloux sees the plague as a sign of God’s love.  He argues that the existence of 
suffering serves as a test to the faithful.  “The sufferings of children were our bread of affliction, 
but without this bread our souls would die of spiritual hunger.”149  Rieux, on the other hand, sees 
the plague as a sign God’s indifference.  Their disagreement is centered on the problem of evil, 
and Camus used this paradox to reinforce the importance of lucidity.  The evocative symbol that 
he used for this purpose is the death of an innocent child. 
                                                 
146Ibid, p. 98. 
147Ibid, p. 99. 
148Ibid, pp. 128-29. 
149Ibid, p. 226. 
 50
 M. Othon, the police magistrate, is a supporter of Father Paneloux.  He optimistically 
instructs Dr. Rieux, “one must never lose hope, the ways of Providence were inscrutable.”150  
The inscrutable ways of Providence, however, result in the death of the magistrate’s son.  This 
contrast is already reflective of the absurd, but Camus depicted this episode with heart-
wrenching detail.  M. Othon’s son suffers longer than most patients because of an experimental 
serum that allows him to fight death for an extended period of time.  The group that attends the 
boy witnesses this entire episode.  The description of the lucidity gained from this experience is 
remarkable: 
They had already seen children die . . . but they had never yet watched a child’s agony 
minute by minute, as they had now been doing since daybreak.  Needless to say, the pain 
inflicted on these innocent victims had always seemed to them to be what in fact it was: 
an abominable thing.  But hitherto they had felt its abomination in, so to speak, an 
abstract way; they had never had to witness over so long a period the death throes of an 
innocent child.151
 
 Rieux and Paneloux, who were present for this terrible episode, are both deeply affected 
by this experience of absurdity, but neither understands the reason for such an occurrence.  
Shortly after the event, Rieux, recalling Paneloux’s sermon, lashes out at the Jesuit highlighting 
the fact that the child did not deserve this fate.  Paneloux’s reply is: “That sort of thing is 
revolting because it passes our human understanding.  But perhaps we should love what we 
cannot understand.”152  Again, Paneloux’s reaction to the absurd is acceptance.  Shortly after the 
death of M. Othon’s son, Paneloux himself comes down with the plague and refuses to see a 
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doctor.  Perhaps his own sense of guilt prevents him from resisting.  Nevertheless, Paneloux’s 
acceptance of the plague culminates in his lonely death. 
Resistance to the Absurd in the Name of Life 
According to Camus, resistance, the appropriate reaction to the absurd, is closely linked 
to formulating an accurate conception of reality.  Those characters in The Plague that refuse to 
acknowledge the absurd obviously display delusional tendencies.  The absurdity contained in this 
work is unavoidable.  On the other hand, characters such as Father Paneloux, who recognize the 
absurd and repulsive nature of the plague, accept the absurd by giving into their desire for unity 
and by assuming that the tortuous events serve a divine purpose.  Still others, such as Dr. Rieux, 
realize that the plague is beyond human comprehension, and because they recognize the 
absurdity of the plague, they resist.  Indeed, Rieux limits his reflection to the immediacy of the 
situation refusing to try to understand the significance of the plague.  He comments to his friend 
Tarrou,  
I have no idea what’s awaiting me or what will happen when all this ends.  For the 
moment I know this; there are sick people and they need curing.  Later on, perhaps, 
they’ll think things over; and so shall I.  But what’s wanted now is to make them well.153
 
Rieux is an admirable character even though he insists that there are no heroics involved 
in his actions.  The reason for this admiration is Camus’s portrayal of the absurd in a realistic and 
intelligible manner.  By employing the evocative symbol of pathos, he is able to give a sense of 
duty and obligation to the measured resistance against the absurd.  Rieux resists the plague by 
alleviating as much suffering as possible without hoping to save the people from the inevitability 
of the absurd.  His resistance, like Meursault and Sisyphus, proclaims the value of life as a 
struggle against death.  Rieux, however, shows that the struggle for life goes beyond the 
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individual, and most times, the absurd must be confronted with a measured expression of 
solidarity. 
The idea of rebellion is treated in more detail in the following chapter, but for the present 
discussion of the absurd, rebellion serves as the result of lucid awareness.  This awareness points 
to the abhorrent yet unavoidable nature of the absurd giving life the character of a permanent 
rebellion against death.  
Conclusion 
  In conclusion, it is necessary to revisit Camus’s meditative ascent described by Eric 
Voegelin.  He characterizes this meditation as a periagoge in which Camus undertook an 
analysis of existence that ultimately led to an appreciation of the here and now.  The phase of 
absurdity, although it seems to be a pessimistic appraisal of existence, is absolutely essential to 
the meditative ascent.  It is in this phase that serious reflection begins.  During this reflective 
period, Camus discovered a logical progression that allowed him to resist the absurd and to 
proclaim the value of life.   Awareness of the absurd, for Camus, was the equivalent of reaching 
“the depths of the turning around” described by Voegelin.154  From these depths, the ascent from 
the metaphorical cave can begin.   
 Camus’s depiction of the absurd in The Plague reinforces the usefulness of absurdist 
consciousness as a first step toward the ascent.  The citizens of Oran experience the absurd 
manifestation of exile in solidarity.  Those who are lucid, realize that the situation is inescapable 
and that all are imprisoned facing the same absurd.  Once the impossibility of evading the absurd 
is established, the only logical reaction is to resist.  In this case, the resistance is against death, 
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and therefore, resistance is synonymous with life.  In the following chapter, the discussion turns 
to the idea of rebellion as a fundamental characteristic of human life.  
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CHAPTER 4.  REBELLION 
 
Introduction 
 The second phase of Camus’s meditative ascent is characterized by rebellion against the 
absurd.  Voegelin writes fondly of Camus’s development in this phase.  “In L’Homme révolté 
(1951) Camus masters the second phase of the ascent, as he accepts that the uncertainty 
concerning the meaning of existence has to be endured as the burden of existence, and as he 
seeks to keep the tension free from dogmatic substitute realities, be they of the theological, 
metaphysical, or ideological variety.”155  By emphasizing the role of lucidity, Camus was able to 
avoid the delusions of ideological or absolutist political stances.  His concept of rebellion is 
necessarily limited in scope as the logic of absurdity reveals. 
Rebellion, although it is treated as a separate phase of Camus’s meditative ascent here, is 
best understood in the context of the absurd.  To reiterate, the absurd arises from the 
confrontation between the rational human being and the irrational ordering of human life in the 
world.  To the rational human being, the order of the world is incomprehensible and thus, absurd.  
In short, the absurd is an existential contradiction. This contradiction characterizes life itself, and 
Camus maintained that any lucid individual should realize that the absurd is inseparable from 
lived experience.  There is no escape; there is no life without the absurd.  This realization led 
Camus to equate life with a permanent struggle or revolution against the absurd and its most 
poignant manifestation, death.   
Camus considered rebellion to be a logical reaction for anyone who possesses the lucidity 
to recognize the absurd, but after elucidating the doctrine of absurdity in The Myth of Sisyphus, 
he noticed an ethical vacuum that was created by this absurdist consciousness.  Seemingly, the 
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absurd provides no foundation for values that may guide action.  Camus noted this danger in the 
opening pages of The Rebel: 
And the concept of the absurd leads only to contradiction as far as the problem of murder 
is concerned.  Awareness of the absurd, when we first claim to deduce a rule of behavior 
from it, makes murder seem a matter of indifference . . .  If we believe in nothing, if 
nothing has any meaning and if we can affirm no values whatsoever, then everything is 
possible and nothing has any importance. . . .  Evil and virtue are mere chance or 
caprice.156
 
The danger that Camus recognized here is that of moral or ethical relativism.  Such relativism 
arises from the realization that life is meaningless.  Referring to mythical figures to reinforce this 
danger, Camus pointed to Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov who famously uttered “If God is dead, 
everything is permitted.”157  The utterly rational Ivan is driven mad by this unbearable freedom 
of action, but Camus insisted that there was a solution to this relativism.  The solution to moral 
relativism was the purpose of his second major philosophical essay, The Rebel. 
 The Myth of Sisyphus approached the concept of absurdity by exploring the logic of 
suicide as a reaction to the absurd.  Similarly, The Rebel examined logical crime or premeditated 
murder as a product of rebellion against the absurd.  Camus’s focus in The Rebel was not crimes 
of passion such as Meursault’s crime in The Stranger, but “logical crime” that is premeditated 
and often justified by philosophy or ideology.158  The Rebel was an attempt to examine the logic 
of political executions and forced human suffering in the name of abstract principles.  Camus 
insisted that the concept of rebellion, the natural reaction to the absurd, held the key to these 
destructive impulses.  By examining the history of rebellious movements, Camus discovered that 
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rebellions often gain excessive momentum and zeal that leads to the destruction of life and the 
principles on which the rebellion was founded.  The logic of rebellion is where the discussion 
now turns.   
The Concept of Rebellion 
 In The Rebel, Camus insisted that the concept of rebellion held the explanation for the 
destructive political movements of the Twentieth Century.  Every rebellion is a form of protest 
and, interestingly, reveals a desire for order.  Camus wrote, 
Rebellion is born of the spectacle of irrationality, confronted with an unjust and 
incomprehensible condition.  But its blind impulse is to demand order in the midst of 
chaos and unity in the very heart of the ephemeral.  It protests, it demands, it insists that 
the outrage be brought to an end, and that what up to now has been built on shifting sands 
should henceforth be founded on rock.159
 
Camus considered this protest to be evidence of the absurdity of existence, but rebellion also 
serves as evidence for the existence of values.  If one rebels against the absurd, obviously there is 
something of value—presumably something that is not absurd—for which to fight.  “Not every 
value entails rebellion, but every act of rebellion tacitly invokes a value.”160  Reason appears to 
be the faculty of human consciousness that compels one to affirm values such as order and 
purpose.  However, reason has limits, and the values that correspond to the rational human 
being’s nostalgia for unity should not be absolute. 
 The destructive form of rebellion, for which Camus designates the term “revolution,” 
does not result from an absence of values but from an uncompromising adherence to absolute 
values.161  The Rebel becomes aware of a value such as freedom or order, and demands that this 
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value be respected at all cost.  Camus referred to this outlook as “All or Nothing” mentality.  
“The rebel himself wants to be ‘all’—to identify himself completely with this good of which he 
has suddenly become aware and by which he wants to be personally recognized and 
acknowledged—or ‘nothing’; in other words, to be completely destroyed by the force that 
dominates him.”162   
The value for which the rebel fights is something that transcends the individual, and in 
time, the abstract value at the root of the rebellion supersedes appreciation of the here and now.  
This is why Camus insisted that the instinct to rebel is metaphysical in origin. If one lives in an 
irrevocably disordered world and still demands order, this amounts to a protest against one’s 
very condition as a man.  “Metaphysical rebellion,” Camus wrote, “is the movement by which 
man protests against his condition and against the whole of creation.  It is metaphysical because 
it contests the ends of man and of creation.”163  The metaphysical instinct to rebel is manifested 
in historical rebellions that sanction the destruction of human beings, but this impulse to rebel 
can also be channeled into a healthy form of political action.  Authentic rebellion, that which is 
consistent with its origins, is characterized by attentiveness and an intense focus on the 
immediate situation.  Historical rebellion, on the other hand, tends to focus on absolute values to 
be attained in the distant future.  Authentic rebels, such as Dr. Rieux in The Plague, exhibit a 
sense of existential immediacy in the act of rebellion that is consistent with an appreciation of 
present reality.  In other words, the authentic rebel remains lucid enough to recognize that the 
metaphysical impulse to rebel is a product of the absurd, and the absurd cannot be settled.  This 
lucidity prevents the authentic rebel from being consumed by his rebellious impulses.  
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 The community of men in which the rebel lives provides yet another metaphysical 
element to rebellion.  The rebel eventually expands individually held values to the whole of 
mankind; therefore, the rebellion is conducted in the name of mankind and human solidarity 
rather than for the purpose of addressing an individual grievance.   
[The rebel] is acting in the name of certain values which are still indeterminate but which 
he feels are common to himself and to all men. . . .  [T]he affirmation implicit in every 
act of rebellion is extended to something that transcends the individual in so far as it 
withdraws him from his supposed solitude and provides him with a reason to act.164
 
Camus continued, “When he rebels, a man identifies himself with other men and so surpasses 
himself, and from this point of view human solidarity is metaphysical.”165  The solidarity of 
mankind supplies the rebel with a cause that transcends the individual, the collective suffering of 
mankind.  This is yet another reason why The Plague corresponds nicely to Camus’s meditative 
ascent.  The symbol of pathos that pervades the novel triggers a sense of rebellion that is 
metaphysical, but in most cases, limited. 
 Such metaphysical rebellion, however, results in destructive revolution when the rebel is 
consumed by the “All or Nothing” mentality.  The absence of God leaves the rebel with absolute 
freedom, but in the name of human solidarity freedom translates into “a prison of absolute 
duties.”166  “From the moment that man believes neither in God nor immortal life, he becomes 
‘responsible for everything alive, for everything that, born of suffering, is condemned to suffer 
from life.’”167  In this state of exile the search for meaning begins, and the rebel’s responsibility 
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is to remake the world itself so that it adheres to the values that are considered important.  When 
the rebel attempts to remake the world, the rebellion goes beyond the realm of ethics into the 
realm of politics.  Camus despaired at the historical outcomes of rebels who attempt to “annex all 
creation.  Every time it experiences a setback, we have already seen that the political solution, 
the solution of conquest, is formulated.”168
 Political dominance is the logical outcome of revolutions that adhere to the “All or 
Nothing” mentality.  Such absolutism treats abstract values as ultimate ends to be achieved at all 
costs, even at the cost of murder.  Thus, the true danger of rebellion is revealed, the danger of 
nihilism.  Clarifying this concept, Camus wrote, “A nihilist is not one who believes in nothing, 
but one who does not believe in what exists.”169  He went on to say that nihilism is the logical 
conclusion of “superior values” that are built on the foundation of an illusion.170  These superior 
values are prized above life itself when the rebel has a lapse in lucidity and fails to recognize the 
value of human life.  The historical examples of nihilism are prolific, ranging from the French 
Revolution to modern day Islamic terrorism.  Voegelin refers to these movements founded upon 
“superior values” as “second realities” that distort the faculty of reasoned judgment.171  The 
absolute values of the revolutionary become the ultimate ends of mankind, and nihilism ensues 
when the experience of the here and now is devalued at the expense of a utopian dream. 
 Despite the danger of nihilism, Camus insisted that rebellion was natural to mankind and 
that it could even be fruitful.  After all, rebellion is often conceived as a pejorative term that 
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usually connotes violence and destruction.  Camus, on the other hand, argued that the logic of 
rebellion dictates limits for human action and in turn, prevents absolute destruction.  Again, 
Camus revisited the logic of absurdity to prove his point:  
The final solution of absurdist reasoning is, in fact, the repudiation of suicide and the 
acceptance of the desperate encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the 
universe. . . .  [A]bsurdism hereby admits that human life is the only necessary good since 
it is precisely life that makes this encounter possible and since, without life, the absurdist 
wager would have no basis. . . .  From the moment that life is recognized as good, it 
becomes good for all men.172
 
This realization that life is “the only necessary good” is a triumph of lucidity.  Indifference to 
life, however, is the triumph of nihilism because in this case, one forgets that life and human 
solidarity are the foundations of rebellion.  Rebellion is a protest against the absurdity of death 
and only a lapse in lucidity, a deviation from logic, will allow rebellion to embrace death.  
“Man’s solidarity is founded upon rebellion, and rebellion in its turn, can only find its 
justification in this solidarity. . . .  [A]ny rebellion which claims the right to deny or destroy this 
solidarity loses simultaneously its right to be called rebellion and becomes in reality an 
acquiescence in murder.”173  
 Camus concluded in The Rebel that true rebellion always acknowledges its own origins 
and establishes limits that prevent it from contradicting these origins.  Only absolute values and 
unlimited means lead to these contradictions.  For this reason, Camus asserted, “If . . . rebellion 
could found a philosophy it would be one of limits, of calculated ignorance, and of risk.”174  The 
rebel must realize that no value can be attained in an absolute sense and he must limit the means 
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of achieving that value accordingly.  Camus wrote, “Rebellion itself only aspires to the relative 
and can only promise an assured dignity coupled with relative justice.  It supposes a limit at 
which the community of man is established.  Its universe is the universe of relative values.”175  
Again, lucidity is necessary to inform the rebel that the absurdity of existence cannot be settled.  
Rebellion is the natural reaction to the absurd, but in Camus’s doctrine of rebellion, values are 
meant to serve as guides for action rather than future goals to be pursued in totality.  It is only 
when lucidity falters that the rebel forgets the reason for his protest and destroys life in pursuit of 
absolute values.  This danger of total revolution was obviously a concern for Camus when he 
wrote his play, The Just Assassins. 
The Just Assassins 
 In The Just Assassins, Camus presented the story of Russian socialist terrorists who 
assassinated the Grand Duke Serge.  Breathing life into this historical account, Camus portrayed 
the complexity involved in rebellion and the necessity of lucidity and limits.  The most militant 
character, Stephen Fedorov, is recently released from prison.  Humiliated during his time in 
prison, Stephen zealously advocates violence and destruction in the name of absolute justice.  On 
the other hand, the poet Ivan Kaliayev and his girlfriend Dora pursue a form of rebellion that is 
enthusiastic yet limited.  In the competing dialogue between these characters, Camus portrayed 
the ethical tension of rebellion with remarkable style.  
 Ivan and Dora, whom Camus considered heroes, are willing to kill for the sake of an ideal 
that they refer to as “justice.”  However, these characters retain the lucidity that is necessary to 
remain faithful to the true cause of the rebellion.  Indeed, Ivan comments that he sees much 
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beauty and joy in the world, and that he joined the revolution because he loves life.176  His 
attitude toward life is congruent with absurdist logic which informs one that life is precious.  He 
intones, “Only, I’m still convinced that life is a glorious thing, I’m in love with beauty, 
happiness.  That’s why I hate despotism.”177  When Ivan is poised to throw a bomb under the 
carriage of the Grand Duke, he hesitates and retreats after seeing the faces of two children in the 
carriage.  Remembering the origins of his rebellion, Ivan cannot bring himself to do violence to 
innocent children.  Again, Camus used the symbol of innocent children to illustrate the often 
overlooked value of life.  Dora emphatically defends Ivan’s decision when the militant Stephen 
protests.  “Open your eyes, Stephen, and try to realize that the group would lose all its driving 
force, were it to tolerate, even for a moment, the idea of children’s being blown to pieces by our 
bombs.”178
 Stephen is the embodiment of nihilism in the play because he considers justice to be an 
absolute value that is more important than human life.  He admits to this with conviction, “I do 
not love life; I love something higher—and that is justice.”179  Stephen wants the revolution to 
succeed at all costs.  When Dora argues that one must acknowledge limits, Stephen replies 
angrily, “There are no limits!”180  Stephen has been mistreated in prison; he is disgusted with the 
world itself, and he would gladly destroy it in the name of absolute justice.  Stephen has fully 
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succumbed to nihilism and his metaphysical revolt becomes fanatical and even hateful as a result 
of his “All or Nothing” mentality.  As the Grand Duke is about to be assassinated, he comments 
to Dora, “There’s so much still to do; we must smash this world we live in, blast it to 
smithereens!”181   
 Stephen’s destructive nihilistic attitude is meant to establish the fact that rebellion itself 
amounts to a rejection of absolutism.  The ringleader, Boris Annenkov, chastises Stephen, “I 
can’t allow you to say that everything’s permissible.  Thousands of our brothers have died to 
make it known that everything is not allowed.”182  The rebel joins the revolution because he feels 
that a limit has been breached; he will tolerate no more injustice.  Therefore, it is illogical for the 
rebellion itself to abolish all limits in the pursuit of setting a limit on injustice.  Camus 
commented upon the ethic of his play in the introduction, “I merely wanted to show that action 
itself had limits.  There is no good and just action but what recognizes those limits and, if it must 
go beyond them, at least accepts death.”183  Although Ivan eventually succeeds in killing the 
Grand Duke, he affirms that there are limits to action, and he is completely willing to pay for the 
act with his life.   
 The rebellion depicted in “The Just Assassins” is historical and concrete; however, 
Camus’s concept of rebellion is also somewhat metaphorical in nature.  One need not join the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party, as the terrorists in the play did, to experience metaphysical 
rebellion.  In an absurd existence, life itself is a form of rebellion and must acknowledge limits.  
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The following section examines rebellion, a characteristic of daily life, as Camus presented it in 
The Plague.  
The Plague 
 As previously stated, Camus thought that the human faculty for rebellion was a logical 
reaction to the absurd.  By exploring the concept of rebellion he discovered a faulty logic that 
leads to nihilism and calculated murder.  The human being is compelled by the absurdity of 
existence to rebel against the manifestations of absurdity in the name of life, happiness, and 
dignity.  This rebellion is natural.  It is only when the values of the rebellion become absolute 
that the rebel forgets the origins of the rebellion and succumbs to nihilistic destruction.  For this 
reason, Camus praised lucidity, the capacity to recognize the essential values of present reality, 
as a primary virtue.  In The Plague, lucidity is much more important than heroism.  The reason 
for this is an overabundance of the latter and an alarming absence of the former in human 
relations.  Camus suggested in The Plague that heroism often leads to overzealous rebellion 
although the rebellion is conducted originally with good intentions.  There is a moving passage 
from the novel in which Dr. Rieux indicates that “callousness and apathy” in society are less 
problematic than misguided heroism. 
The evil that is in the world always comes from ignorance, and good intentions may do as 
much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding.  On the whole, men are more 
good than bad; that, however, isn’t the real point.  But they are more or less ignorant and 
that is what we call vice or virtue; the most incorrigible vice being that of an ignorance 
that fancies it knows everything and therefore claims for itself the right to kill.  The soul 
of the murderer is blind; and there can be no true goodness nor true love without the 
utmost clear-sightedness.184    
 
In this passage, Camus revealed his conviction that human beings, on average, are more inclined 
to good than evil, a theme he would reiterate throughout the novel.  Destructive revolutions, 
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according to Camus, are not a product of man’s fallen nature, but a result of metaphysical 
rebellion that is well-intended but poorly thought out.   
 The depiction of rebellion in The Plague is meant to highlight the usefulness of rebellion 
against the absurd.  In fact, the entire novel can be read as a myth concerning the nostalgic 
human being’s never-ending battle against the absurd.  Because of the variety of characters, 
Camus was able to illustrate many possible forms of rebellion, but the following discussion is 
limited to four characters in particular that represent the full spectrum of rebellious behavior.  All 
four characters love life in their own way, but the difference in their outlooks can be explained 
by their varying capacities for lucidity and their sensitivities to the solidarity of mankind. 
Rambert—Happiness to Solidarity 
 The lonely unfortunate position of the journalist, Rambert, has been mentioned before.  
Rambert’s attempt to escape from Oran once the town is quarantined is ostensibly a cowardly 
attempt to avoid the absurd.  Perhaps it is cowardly, but Camus did not portray Rambert as a 
coward.  For instance, Rambert mentions to Dr. Rieux that his attempt to escape is not motivated 
by self preservation, and his justification for this is his participation in the Spanish Civil War on 
the side of the Republicans.  The Spanish Civil War, for Camus, marked a despicable failure of 
Western Europe to defend the rights and dignity of human beings.  Defending the choice of 
Spain as the setting for his play, State of Siege, Camus wrote, “You have forgotten that in 1936 a 
rebellious general, in the name of Christ, raised up an army of Moors, hurled them against the 
legally constituted government of the Spanish Republic, won victory for an unjust cause after the 
massacres that can never be expiated, and initiated a frightful repression that has lasted ten years 
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and is not yet over.”185  This stinging indictment of Franco’s regime reveals the overwhelming 
importance of this symbol for Camus.  Rambert, by fighting against Franco, serves as the 
embodiment of resistance to tyranny, and can hardly be labeled a coward.  
 Indeed, Dr. Rieux is sympathetic to Rambert’s cause because he acknowledges the 
necessity of happiness and love.  These are values of the present, and although they are 
individual, and maybe even selfish, Camus indicated that man is entitled to opt for love and 
happiness.  In a world characterized as absurd, the struggle for love and happiness amounts to 
rebellion.  Camus described the “heartrendingly monotonous struggle put up by some obstinate 
people like Rambert to recover their lost happiness . . . [W]hile their resistance lacked the active 
virtues of the other . . . it bore witness, even in its futility and incoherences, to a salutary 
pride.”186  Rambert’s reaction to the absurd is an individual rebellion in the name of happiness, 
and Camus suggested that this reaction is justified.  Of course, Rambert comes to realize that the 
existence of happiness and love for the entire town of Oran is in jeopardy, and he decides to 
remain in Oran to work on Dr. Rieux’s sanitary squads.  Originally fighting his own absurd 
condition in the name of happiness, Rambert decides to fight for the collective happiness of the 
townspeople.  Through solidarity, Rambert discovers a cause that transcends him as an 
individual, and by choosing to fight for the community rather than for his own happiness, he 
discovers a productive outlet for his metaphysical impulse to rebel.  
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Dr. Rieux—The Authentic Rebel 
 The narrator, Dr. Rieux serves as a perfect representation of authentic rebellion that is 
lucid and limited.  As a physician, Rieux is uniquely exposed to the realities of human suffering, 
and the ordering of the universe is clearly repulsive to him.  Camus wrote, “Rieux believed 
himself to be on the right road—in fighting against creation as he found it.”187  He witnesses 
death and suffering regularly through his occupation, and these forces shape the world in which 
he lives.  God, for Rieux, is the embodiment of an unjust, irrational ordering of existence.  He 
poses a rhetorical question to his friend, Jean Tarrou, “[S]ince the order of the world is shaped by 
death, mightn’t it be better for God if we refuse to believe in Him and struggle with all our might 
against death, without raising our eyes toward the heaven where He sits in silence?”188  Rieux is 
somewhat similar to Ivan Karamazov in the sense that he blames God for the existence of evil.  
Both characters (not to mention, Camus himself) reveal some ambiguity in their religious beliefs; 
they are not certain that God does not exist, but they furiously refuse to believe in Him 
regardless.  
 Struggling against the incomprehensible absurdity of existence, Rieux is undoubtedly the 
quintessential rebel.  The importance of Dr. Rieux for the concept of rebellion is not only the 
diligence of his rebellion, but the limited nature of his resistance. When the Jesuit, Father 
Paneloux tells Rieux that they are both fighting for man’s salvation, Rieux corrects him, 
“Salvation’s much too big a word for me.  I don’t aim so high.  I’m concerned with man’s health; 
and for me his health comes first.”189  Salvation is a value of the distant future; health is a value 
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of the present.  Rieux’s lucidity grounds him to the immediacy of the situation, and although the 
absolute vigilance of the plague prevents him from healing absolutely, he doggedly persists.  The 
seemingly futile duties of the “sanitary squads” reflect the necessity of rebellion in the name of 
present life.  “The essential thing was to save the greatest possible number of persons from dying 
and being doomed to separation.  And to do this there was only one resource: to fight the plague. 
There was nothing admirable about this attitude; it was merely logical.”190
 Rieux does not consider himself a hero or a saint.  His chronicle of the plague merely 
represents the absurdity of existence and the logical reaction to that absurdity.  “It could be only 
the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the 
never ending fight against terror and its onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, 
while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be 
healers.”191  Rieux’s friend, Tarrou, is clearly one who strives to be a healer, but his aim is 
somewhat more absolute than Rieux’s.  Tarrou is more interested in eradicating the plague from 
the face of the earth.   
Jean Tarrou—The Penitent Rebel 
 Camus presented Tarrou as an utterly decent man, albeit one who is susceptible to lapses 
in lucidity.  He appreciates the everyday pleasures of life. “Good-humored, always ready with a 
smile, he seemed an addict of all normal pleasures without being their slave.”192  When Tarrou 
recognizes the onslaught of the plague, he takes it upon himself to assemble volunteers into 
sanitary squads.  Tarrou’s enthusiasm is admirable and his display of solidarity with the 
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townspeople is unquestionable.  Unlike Rieux, however, Tarrou’s rebellion more closely 
resembles atonement than protest. 
 Tarrou admits to Dr. Rieux that he once had a form of plague.  As a young man, appalled 
by the cruelty of capital punishment, Tarrou joined a revolutionary sect in Hungary with 
intentions of abolishing the death penalty.  Tarrou admits that his metaphysical impulse to rebel 
crossed over into the political realm: “To my mind the social order around me was based on the 
death sentence, and by fighting the established order I’d be fighting against murder.”193  He was 
fighting against death and injustice the same as Rieux, but his absolutist stance against the death 
penalty led him to be complicit in the murders of political enemies.  It should be noted that 
Camus himself advocated “justice without mercy” for the collaborators of the Vichy government 
until he became disgusted with the political executions of various intellectuals.194  He would 
never speak in favor of the death penalty again.  Tarrou admits that he acquiesced to the 
inevitability of some executions in the name of “building up a new world in which murder would 
cease to be.”195  This is a perfect example of the dangers involved with any rebellion that does 
not stay true to its origins.  Tarrou’s lapse in lucidity caused him to take part in the very injustice 
against which he set out to fight.  He rebelled because he thought society was breaching a 
threshold of injustice, but in his rebellion, he breached the same limit.  He compromised the 
present value of human life for the unattainable future value of a plague-free society.  After 
witnessing an execution by firing squad, he regained his lucidity and spent the rest of his life 
trying to avoid the plague of rationally justified murder.  He recounts his lesson learned to Rieux, 
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“The good man, the man who infects hardly anyone, is the man who has the fewest lapses of 
attention.”196
 Thus, Tarrou spends the rest of his days trying to find peace and tirelessly avoiding 
murder.  He asks Rieux. “Can one be a saint without God?—that’s the problem, in fact the only 
problem, I’m up against today.”197  Tarrou finds no answer to this inquiry, and his life is one of 
the last claimed by the plague.  Again, Camus suggested that heroics and saintliness are above 
the scope of human possibility.  Dr. Rieux realized this.  He answered Tarrou, “Heroism and 
sanctity don’t really appeal to me, I imagine.  What interests me is being a man.”198
Cottard—Nihilist and Collaborator 
 M. Cottard, the final character examined here, represents the historical expression of 
metaphysical rebellion.  The reader makes his acquaintance shortly after he tries to hang himself.  
Cottard is distressed because a crime from his past has been uncovered by the town officials, and 
he fears he will be arrested.  When the plague sets in, Cottard’s mood changes dramatically 
because the officials are preoccupied and because all the townspeople are similarly imperiled.  
Tarrou, who observes Cottard’s behavior closely, discovers that Cottard values solidarity.  “The 
thing he’d most detest is being cut off from others; he’d rather be one of a beleaguered crowd 
than a prisoner alone.”199  He relishes the fact that “everyone’s in the same boat.”200
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 Cottard takes advantage of the plague, and has no desire to see it end.  If the plague 
represents the Nazi occupation of France, Cottard is undoubtedly a Vichy collaborator.  Tarrou 
records in his journal, “In short, this epidemic has done him proud.  Of a lonely man who hated 
loneliness it has made an accomplice. . . .  and doesn’t he relish his complicity!”201  Lonely 
before the start of plague and quarantine, Cottard discovers a morbid solidarity in the town of 
Oran because the overwhelming absurdity of his own life is shared by all.  What he fails to 
realize is that the plague which he welcomes can destroy the very solidarity that he values.  For 
Camus, who clearly sympathizes with Cottard’s unfortunate situation, his complicity in the 
plague is more despicable than the unmentioned crime of his past.  “His only real crime is that of 
having in his heart approved of something that killed off men, women, and children.”202
 Why, then, is Cottard a nihilist?  Simply, he prizes the miserable solidarity of the plague 
that is forced on the town of Oran, but he despises the community of men from which his 
imprisonment would exclude him.  For example, once the quarantine is lifted, Cottard opens fire 
on the people as they are rejoicing in the streets.203  His “All or Nothing” attitude is similar to 
that of Stephen Fedorov from “The Just Assassins.”  Like Stephen, Cottard would rather see the 
world destroyed than to be deprived of the solidarity that he values absolutely.  This is the reason 
that he passionately relates to Dr. Rieux that what Oran really needs is “An earthquake! A big 
one!”204
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Conclusion 
 As Camus’s showed in The Plague, rebellion takes many forms.  However, he established 
in The Rebel, that only limited rebellion is logical.  What, then, is the role of rebellion in the 
periagoge?  The first phase of the ascent, absurdity, fosters an awareness of existence and 
informs man of his limits.  In the phase of rebellion, Camus discovered that this awareness must 
be applied to the whole of human action.  “Just as danger provided man with the unique 
opportunity of seizing awareness, so metaphysical revolt extends awareness to the whole of 
experience. . . .  That revolt is the certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that ought 
to accompany it.”205  Acknowledgement of the absurd is not enough; the rebel must live a life 
that is consistent with the absurd.  Camus recognized the absurd and began his ascent in the first 
phase.  In the second phase, he realized that extreme focus is needed for one to act and maintain 
one’s lucid awareness of the absurd.   
Voegelin mentions Camus’s ability to resist the temptation of substitute realities as an 
essential feature of this phase.  This is why Camus equated rebellion with “the certainty of a 
crushing fate.”  The rebel must never forget that the absurd is an irrevocable characteristic of life.  
Second realities tempt one to deny the certainty of this “crushing fate,” and this false optimism 
leads to foolish heroism and destruction in the name of absolute values.  Camus refers to lucidity 
as the faculty that allows one to avoid such dangerous perversions.  Lucidity guides the authentic 
rebel on the correct path of the ascent toward the light.  Inattentiveness, on the other hand, leads 
to deviations from the appropriate path as the rebel pursues absolute values.  A common thread 
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in the writings of both Camus and Voegelin is their focus on present reality and the values of 
human beings who occupy that reality.  Both writers frequently dismiss attempts to alter reality 
in the name of a future that remains uncertain.   
 Camus remained faithful to the logic of absurdity in his treatment of rebellion.  His 
portrayal of rebellion in The Plague was meant to show that the absurdity of existence can be 
overwhelming, but it is essential for one to remain within the scope of human possibility.  
Perhaps one may criticize the fact that Camus’s concept of rebellion is futile since it is 
impossible to mitigate the absurd.  There is some validity to this criticism; however, there is also 
hope for brief moments of satisfaction that contain a world of significance for Camus.  The 
possibility of attaining that fulfillment is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5.  FULFILLMENT 
 
Introduction 
 The third phase of Camus’s meditative ascent is very ambiguous.  He wrote no 
philosophical essay outlining the concept of fulfillment as he did for the phases of absurdity and 
rebellion.  Voegelin writes, “The third phase of this meditative progress, from which he hoped to 
gain the freedom to create . . . was interrupted by his untimely death.”206  Camus was never able 
to articulate clearly his progression after The Rebel partially because he suffered intense writer’s 
block after he was awarded the Nobel Prize.  Voegelin speculates that Camus had indeed begun 
to move past the phase of rebellion into “not morality, but fulfillment.  And there is no 
fulfillment other than that of love, meaning the renunciation of self and dying to the world.”207  
This cryptic remark indicates that fulfillment, which is closely associated with love, involves a 
slightly altruistic impulse and a form of communal consciousness that eclipses the concerns of 
the individual. 
Voegelin suggests that Camus’s “new insight gained through love” coincided with the 
formulation of an ethic.  This ethic which Voegelin refers to as a “vision of a cure” emerges after 
the temptations of revolt have subsided.  “Revolt,” he writes, “has reached its . . . meridian of 
thought . . . men deny themselves the right to become gods and thus relinquish the unlimited 
power to inflict death.  The new rule of ethics, the only one . . . which is original today: to learn 
to live and die, and, in order to be a man, to refuse to be a god.”208  Voegelin’s description of this 
ethic is very similar to Camus’s discussion of limits.  The “meridian of thought” that Voegelin 
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refers to is Camus’s discovery that the logic of rebellion necessitates limits.  Voegelin ultimately 
concludes that Camus’s meditation was leading him in the direction of “an active life ordered by 
a loving tension toward the divine ground, a tension in which the autonomous self dissolves.”209    
Voegelin may have been somewhat hasty to argue that Camus moved past rebellion on 
his way to fulfillment.  Camus was careful to distinguish between authentic and historical 
rebellion; the former is an essential characteristic of life, defining man’s relation to the absurd.  
Because the absurd cannot be reconciled, neither can rebellion.  Therefore, it is safe to assume 
that if Camus achieved a sense of fulfillment, he did so in the process of rebellion.  The 
following discussion considers what exactly fulfillment means for Camus. 
Camus and Fulfillment 
It is important to establish at the outset that fulfillment for Camus can only signify a 
worldly type of fulfillment rather than a transcendent appeal for salvation.  In The Myth of 
Sisyphus, he revealed that the absurd is not eternal, but wedded to “man’s universe.”210  
Fulfillment cannot be reached by any “leaps” because this would amount to evading the absurd.  
Instead, man must “forge a unity for himself” in the secular world.211  Camus did not accept the 
possibility of salvation, and he wrote for those that had to face the absurd without any appeal to 
grace.  In an interview entitled “No, I am not an existentialist,” he stated emphatically that he did 
not believe in God.  He continued, “After all, I don’t see why I should apologize for being 
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interested in those who live outside Grace.  It is high time we began concerning ourselves with 
them, since they are most numerous.”212  
Camus was an atheist; although, he was fascinated with Judeo-Christian symbolism.  His 
writings reveal a deep-seated affinity for the symbols of tradition as well as a deep-seated 
rejection of immorality and the notion of a higher power.  In his notebooks he wrote, “Secret of 
my universe: imagining God without human immortality.”213  When he was later asked to clarify 
the meaning of this statement, he replied, “I have a sense of the sacred and I don’t believe in a 
future life, that is all.”214  This comment suggests that Camus considered a spiritual bond with 
present reality to be more important than faith in God and heaven.  In The Myth of Sisyphus, 
Camus describes the ability of art or myth to foster this spiritual bond with the present.  
All that remains is a fate whose outcome alone is fatal.  Outside of that single fatality of  
death, everything, joy or happiness, is liberty.  A world remains of which man is the sole  
master.  What bound him was the illusion of another world.  The outcome of his thought   
. . . flowers in images.  It frolics—in myths, to be sure, but myths with no other depth  
than that of human suffering and, like it, inexhaustible.  Not the divine fable that amuses  
and blinds, but the terrestrial face, gesture, and drama in which are summed up a difficult  
wisdom and an ephemeral passion.215   
 
Camus’s sensibilities more closely resemble those of paganism than the Christian tradition. 
 A few passages from Camus’s Notebooks reveal that he was spiritually disenchanted with 
the prevailing notions of salvation: faith and reason.  Camus considered neither option 
satisfactory.  “We are asked to choose between God and history.  Whence this dreadful longing 
to choose the earth, the world, and trees, if I were not absolutely sure that all mankind does not 
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coincide with history.”216  Refusing to appeal to religious or historical salvation, Camus was 
inclined to deify the earth itself as the pagans had once done.  He clearly thought that 
Christianity detracted from the importance and beauty of the immanent world.  He wrote, “If, to 
outgrow nihilism, one must turn to Christianity, one may well follow the impulse and outgrow 
Christianity in Hellenism.”217  Growing up on the Mediterranean rather than on the continent of 
Europe, Camus idolized the natural beauty of the world.  This was a disposition that he held even 
as a young man.  In an essay published in 1938, he wrote, “The world is beautiful, and outside it 
there is no salvation.”218  
 How, then, does one achieve “salvation” inside the world, if at all?  For Camus, any 
worldly salvation from the absurd must be temporary, but that is not to say that these moments of 
fulfillment are not valuable.  In The Rebel, Camus described human beings as “estranged citizens 
of the world, exiled from their own country.  Except for vivid moments of fulfillment, all reality 
for them is incomplete.”219  Fulfillment, it seems, is that which completes one’s picture of the 
world.  As a young man, Camus recorded his own sense of fulfillment after spending time on the 
beach in the small village of Tipasa on the Mediterranean coast.  “I had performed my task as a 
man, and the fact that I had known joy for one entire day seemed to me not an exceptional 
success but the intense fulfillment of a condition which, in certain circumstance, makes it our 
duty to be happy.” 220  Continuing, he described this “intense fulfillment” as a “harmony” 
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between him and the world.  “No, it was neither I nor the world that counted, but solely the 
harmony and silence that gave birth to the love between us.  A love I was not foolish enough to 
claim for myself alone, proudly aware that I shared it with a whole human race born of the sun 
and sea alive and spirited.”221  This harmony which gives rise to fulfillment is not based solely 
upon the individual’s relation to the world, but on the whole of humanity’s relation to the world.  
Perhaps the possibility of this communal harmony can serve as the foundation of an ethic, but 
before considering this, it is essential to address the relationship between fulfillment and the 
absurd. 
 “One does not discover the absurd,” Camus wrote, “without being tempted to write a 
manual of happiness. . . .  There is but one world, however.  Happiness and the absurd are two 
sons of the same earth.  They are inseparable.”222  Indeed, the brief instances of fulfillment can 
actually reinforce the absurd because fulfillment is not meant to last.  Rather than obfuscate the 
absurd, fulfillment reminds human beings of their nostalgia for unity, and lucidity informs them 
that this nostalgia cannot be satisfied.  In an essay entitled “Summer in Algiers,” Camus wrote, 
“Everything that exalts life at the same time increases its absurdity.  In the Algerian summer I 
learn that only one thing is more tragic than suffering, and that is the life of a happy man.”223  
Once these instances of fulfillment subside, man is drawn again headlong into the absurdity of 
existence.  The “harmony” between man and the world is replaced by the “divorce” that 
characterizes their interaction as absurd. 
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The Possibility of an Ethic 
 Given the ephemeral nature of fulfillment and the frequent reemergence of the absurd, 
Camus had trouble developing an ethic.  Voegelin argues that his insight gained through “love” 
placed him closer to an understanding of ethics.  Love is a recurring theme near the end of his 
Notebooks.  He wrote, “One must encounter love before having encountered ethics.  Or else one 
is torn.”224  Camus had developed a loving bond with the human race and the physical world.  
His purpose in The Rebel was to build an ethic based on his insights gained through this love.  
This entry in his Notebooks reveals his intentions: 
My effort: show that the logic of revolt rejects blood and selfish motives.  And that the 
dialogue carried through the absurd gives a chance to purity.—Through compassion? 
(suffer together).”225  
 
Camus’s compassion and respect for the common dignity of mankind serve as the foundation of 
his ethic which he elucidates in the concluding pages of The Rebel.  “I alone, in one sense, 
support the common dignity that I cannot allow either myself or others to debase.  This 
individualism is in no sense pleasure; it is perpetual struggle, and sometimes, unparalleled joy 
when it reaches the height of proud compassion.”226  There is joy, but it always emerges from a 
struggle.  In this sense, Camus’s ethic recommends that we share in the struggles of mankind, 
while being careful not to exacerbate any existing suffering, in an attempt to achieve fulfillment.  
A passage from the final page of The Rebel reinforces this point.  
 At this meridian of thought, the rebel thus rejects divinity in order to share in the  
struggles and destiny of all men. . . .  In the light of the earth remains our first and our  
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last love.  Our brothers are breathing under the same sky as we; justice is a living thing.  
Now is born a strange joy which helps one live and die, and which we shall never again 
postpone to a later time.227    
 
If there is a divine ground for Camus, it is the community of men that are born from the same 
earth.  This is the light to which he ascends, and it is the foundation of his ethic. 
 The ethic that Camus formulates at the conclusion of The Rebel may not be satisfactory 
to some because it rests upon relative values, and therefore, it is not certain.   In other words, 
Camus offered no monologue, or propositions to establish a code of ethics.  A comment from his 
Notebooks explains his restraint. 
Progress and true nobility lie in the dialogue from man to man and not in the Gospel, a  
monologue and dictated from the top of a solitary mountain.  That’s where I stand.  What  
balances the absurd is the community of men fighting against it.  And if we choose to  
serve that community, we choose to serve the dialogue carried to the absurd against any  
policy of falsehood or of silence.228   
 
John Krapp has argued that Camus’s aesthetic talents allowed him to pursue ethical questions by 
establishing a dialogue between competing ethical voices.229  Camus did indeed develop his 
ethic in an aesthetic manner. 
Fulfillment and Art 
 Camus’s admiration for artistic creation is unmistakable.  What is interesting, however, in 
terms of fulfillment, is the source of the artistic impulse.  The desire for unity, that persistent 
human impulse which longs for solace, is the source of art.  
This passion which lifts the mind above the commonplaces of a dispersed world, from  
which it nevertheless cannot free itself, is the passion for unity. . . .  Religion or crime,  
every human endeavor in fact, finally obeys this unreasonable desire and claims to give  
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life a form it does not have.  The same impulse, which can lead to the adoration of the  
heavens or the destruction of man, also leads to creative literature, which derives its  
serious content from this source.230
 
Camus revealed in this passage that crime, religion, and artistic creation are all manifestations of 
same human impulse to find unity.  Crime is an illogical reaction to this impulse; proving this 
was the purpose of The Rebel.  Religion, however, satisfies the desire for unity if one is 
comfortable with the premises.  Camus was not.  He did not attempt to refute the existence of 
God in any systematic manner, but simply could not find truth in Christianity.  Camus’s aversion 
to religion was not based on political resentment or arrogance; he simply could not honestly 
accept the Christian form of salvation. 
 Camus channeled his own desire for unity into artistic creation.  He seemed to indicate 
that artistic creation is a productive expression of the desire for unity because it is necessarily 
restrained.  Speculating on “the advent of creative artists,” Camus envisioned a situation in 
which “refusal and acceptance, the unique and the universal, the individual and history balance 
each other in a condition of acute tension.”231  This creative “tension” that Camus described is 
very similar to Voegelin’s own metaphorical description of reality.  Indeed, he speculates that 
Camus’s progress was leading him to “an active life ordered by a loving tension toward the 
divine ground.”232  Camus thought art had the ability to preserve this tension. 
 Because Camus did consider art a more worthwhile endeavor than religious devotion or 
crime, it is prudent to consider the relationship between artistic creation and fulfillment.  The 
criminal and the believer both seek a permanent form of fulfillment; the criminal pursues an 
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immanent world of perfect justice, while the believer pursues a transcendent world of eternal 
salvation.  The artist, on the other hand, merely attempts to capture brief instances of fulfillment 
and recreates them in a meaningful way.  Camus wrote, “Art thus leads us back to the origins of 
rebellion, to the extent that it tries to give its form to an elusive value which the future 
perpetually promises, but of which the artist has a presentiment and wished to snap from the 
grasp of history.”233  Art gives form to any hopes of fulfillment, although it does not presume to 
establish fulfillment in a permanent fashion. 
 Camus once described artistic creation as a “rejection of the world.  But it rejects the 
world,” he wrote, “on account of what it lacks and on account of what it sometimes is.”234  For 
Camus, the world lacks much indeed.  It is devoid of meaning, order, and often, compassion.  
Nevertheless, the world is also full of value for Camus.  He saw potential in individuals and 
never overlooked the beauty of the physical world.  By examining the components of the world 
that Camus values and those that he rejects, one is in a better position to understand his 
conception of ethics.  The following passage from The Rebel highlights the tension in which man 
exists and establishes the importance of aesthetic concerns in establishing an ethic: 
 The procedure of beauty, which is to contest reality while endowing it with unity, is also  
the procedure of rebellion.  Is it possible eternally to reject injustice without ceasing to  
acclaim the nature of man and the beauty of the world?  Our answer is yes.  This ethic, at  
once unsubmissive and loyal, is in any event the only one that lights the way to a truly  
realistic revolution.  In upholding beauty, we prepare the way for the day of regeneration  
when civilization will give first place—far ahead of the formal principles and degraded  
values of history—to this living virtue on which is founded the common dignity of man 
and the world he lives in, and which we must now defend in the face of a world that 
insults it.235   
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Given the emphasis that Camus placed on the relationship between aesthetics and ethics, the 
presentation of fulfillment in his fictional works is worthy of attention.  An examination of these 
works will help reveal how he was able to establish this “living virtue” and found upon it the 
dignity of man. 
Exile and the Kingdom 
 In his collection of short stories, Exile and the Kingdom, Camus used symbols in the 
midst of narrative to explore the nature of the absurd and fulfillment.  This much is evident in the 
title of the work.  Exile is the sensation that corresponds to the absurdity of existence, and the 
kingdom is that which promises to conquer the absurd and put an end to exile.  Each short story 
depicts a seemingly absurd situation ranging from imprisonment and torture to a simple failure in 
communication.  In this work, Camus showed that the absurd takes many forms.  The absurd is 
perhaps more noticeable in cases of calamity, such as in The Plague, but in Exile and the 
Kingdom, Camus showed that the mundane interactions of everyday life are part of the absurd 
and can foster feelings of exile.  In the first five stories of this work, exile coincides with a 
sensation of longing and impotence.  For example, these stories depict a woman dissatisfied with 
her marriage, a schoolteacher who is unable to help a prisoner, an artist who is unable to paint, 
and a priest who is tortured and converted to worshipping a tribal Fetish.  These characters are 
helpless to alleviate their own exile, although, they can conceive of a “kingdom” in which their 
suffering will cease.  At the conclusion of the work, Camus hints that a kingdom may be 
attainable, but the nature of this kingdom, and the means of arriving there are the most 
interesting features.  
 In Exile and the Kingdom, Camus showed that exile is often experienced solitarily, but 
that we are not alone in this sensation.  There is a common level on which exile reaches all of 
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mankind.  On this level communication is possible and the burden of exile can be shared.  This 
was the lesson of the final short story in the collection, “The Growing Stone.”  The primary 
character, D’Arrast, an engineer traveling to the Brazilian jungle town of Iguape to build a jetty, 
harbors a secret anguish and gives the impression that he has come to Brazil to distance himself 
from the past.  While on his trip, he encounters a ship’s cook who would redeem him from his 
exile.  The ship’s cook tells D’Arrast that he was once on a ship that caught fire, and he was 
stranded out at sea without a life boat.  He made a promise to Jesus that if saved, he would carry 
a hundred-pound stone in a procession to the church during the Iguape celebration.  However, on 
the day of the procession, the ship’s cook is weary, stumbling, and cannot carry the rock all the 
way to the church.  He looks up to D’Arrast with a tear stained face, devastated that he could not 
keep his promise to Jesus.  At this moment, D’Arrast lifts the stone himself and begins to carry 
it.   
 The stone is not D’Arrast’s burden; it was not he who promised.  Indeed, D’Arrast is not 
a religious person.  Still, he recognizes the suffering of the ship’s cook—a man he has only 
recently met—and shares it.  After lifting the stone, D’Arrast proceeds to the church, but then 
turns in the direction of the huts where the poor live.  He finally reaches the cook’s hut and 
throws the stone in the center of the fire.  D’Arrast then rests in the hut where he felt somewhat 
unwelcome the previous night.  The crowd of people arrives and the cook’s brother says, “Sit 
down with us.”236  D’Arrast’s compassion earns him a place with the people of Iguape.  He is no 
longer an exile, an outsider.  As the cook’s family is sitting around the stone, D’Arrast 
experiences true fulfillment: 
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 They were squatting in a silent circle around the stone.  No sound but the murmur of the  
river reached them through the heavy air.  Standing in the darkness, D’Arrast listened 
without seeing anything, and the sound of the waters filled him with a tumultuous 
happiness. With eyes closed, he joyfully acclaimed his own strength; he acclaimed, once 
again, a fresh beginning in life.237   
 
 The “kingdom” that Camus presented in this story has identifiable qualities.  D’Arrast 
experiences fulfillment in the knowledge that he is at one with his fellow man.  He forges this 
bond by bearing the burden of another, and by doing so, gains the possibility of beginning life 
anew.  Also, in a gesture of unmistakable symbolism, D’Arrast turns away from the church and 
towards the village of huts.  He turns away from God and towards the people.  Rather than drop 
the stone at the church, D’Arrast enters the cook’s hut and drops it on the hearth.  The growing 
stone that was to serve as a tribute to Christ is placed instead on the fire.  D’Arrast uses it as a 
tribute to life.  
The Struggle for Fulfillment in The Plague 
 In Camus’s meditative journey, the stage of fulfillment is meant to show that some solace 
can be achieved by resisting the absurd.  In The Rebel, Camus argued that rebellion is necessary 
because it is a logical reaction to the absurd, but can one form a rule of life based solely on 
consistent logic?  In The Plague, Camus showed that rebellion is not completely futile, and there 
are instances of life that are worthy of resistance.  
 Throughout the entire novel, Dr. Rieux never ceases to struggle.  Even at the end, once he 
has lost his wife and best friend, Rieux still must make his medical rounds.  For Rieux, these 
rounds contain a “certitude” that gives him purpose.238  In fact, Rieux finds solace at the end of 
his days when he returns home to see his mother.  This moment is very similar to Sisyphus’s 
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sense of fulfillment when he descends from his mountain.  Camus uses the symbol of a mother’s 
love to communicate the usefulness of Rieux’s struggle.  “[S]omething always changed in his 
mother’s face when he came in.  The silent resignation that a laborious life had given it seemed 
to light up with a sudden glow.”239  The look of approval and adoration on his mother’s face tells 
Rieux that there is some value in the world for which to fight. 
 The struggle for fulfillment in The Plague is not predominantly individual, but collective.  
Cottard is an example of one who struggles solely for his own fulfillment and finds no answer.  
His resistance is not only selfish, but lonely.  Rieux, Tarrou, and the aspiring writer Joseph 
Grand, on the other hand, are concerned with helping others, and they do so together.  They 
forge a sturdy friendship while working side by side in the sanitary squads.  Tarrou and Rieux 
even begin to help Grand in his writing.  “They began to take a genuine interest in the laborious 
literary task to which he was applying himself while the plague raged above him.  Indeed, they, 
too, found it a relaxation of the strain.”240  These three friends do not undertake sanitation duties 
in order to cure, but in order to share in the struggle for life and against death.  Rieux realizes this 
at the end of the novel: “[H]e has deliberately taken the victims’ side and tried to share with his 
fellow citizens the only certitudes they had in common—love, exile, and suffering.  Thus he can 
truly say there was not one of their anxieties in which he did not share, no predicament of theirs 
that was not his.”241
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The Substance of Fulfillment in The Plague 
 Camus suggested that rebellion against the absurd could lead to fulfillment, but he also 
gave hints as to the content of that fulfillment.  It is not the actualization of total justice or the 
abolition of suffering; rather, fulfillment lies in small victories over suffering and the everyday 
joys of life that afford the opportunity of happiness.  Tarrou is a character who appreciates the 
immediacy of these pleasures.  Rieux observes that Tarrou is “fond of swimming,” “good-
humored,” and “an addict of small pleasures without being their slave.”242  Having once been an 
advocate of absolute justice, Tarrou realizes that human happiness gives substance to the life for 
which he fights.  For this reason, he suggests to Rieux that they go for a swim and take time 
away from the sanitary squads for the sake of friendship.  “Of course, a man should fight for the 
victims,” he comments to Rieux, “but if he ceases caring for anything outside that, what’s the use 
of his fighting?”243   
 Tarrou reminds Rieux that their struggle is taken up in the name of present life.  This is 
one message that Camus was trying to convey in The Plague.  Voegelin’s insight is particularly 
useful in this respect.  He argues that Camus had begun to arrive at “the joy of the here and 
now.”244  This joy is not only the substance of fulfillment; it is the substance of life.  It is in the 
name of this joy that one must resist the absurd.  Rieux resists because he feels obligated to “the 
society of the living.”245  A “concrete illustration” of this, he reveals, is “sea-bathing”—one of 
Camus’s favorite activities. 
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 The sanitary squads in The Plague could perhaps serve as a metaphor for any resistance 
movement that claims to fight in the name of human life, but Camus revealed that the cause of 
resistance should be more personal than abstract.  For example, Rieux’s duty as a doctor is to 
enforce the quarantine in order to minimize the transmission of the plague microbe.  Still, he 
chooses to help Rambert escape.  After warning Rambert to hurry, “Rieux noticed that for the 
first time since the outbreak of plague, he was smiling.”246  When Rambert asks the doctor why 
he has not tried to stop him, Rieux replies with a smile, “Perhaps because I, too, would like to do 
my bit for happiness.”247  Although Rieux has committed to fighting the plague, his allegiance to 
the resistance has not eclipsed his allegiance to mankind. 
 Besides happiness, human beings also have the potential for love.  This is yet another 
element in The Plague that adds a personal or concrete component to the resistance.  In one of 
the most heated exchanges of the novel, Rambert explains his initial decision to leave Oran:  
“Well, personally, I’ve seen enough of people who die for an idea.  I don’t believe in heroism; I 
know it’s easy and I’ve learned it can be murderous.  What interests me is living and dying for 
what one loves.”248  From Rambert’s perspective, the sanitary squads treat people as abstract 
entities; in other words, they fight for an idea.  In his own case, the bureaucracy has not 
considered his own special needs and the importance of love.  Rieux reminds Rambet that man is 
not an idea, and Rambert retorts, “Man is an idea, and a precious small idea, once he turns his 
back on love.”249  
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 Voegelin argues that Camus gained new insight through love.  Taken in the context of 
fulfillment, this is quite accurate, and traces of this insight are present in The Plague.  As Rieux 
walks through the streets of Oran after the quarantine has been lifted, he observes the celebration 
taking place and ponders its significance.  This touching description is worth quoting at length. 
 Yes, they had suffered together, in body no less than in soul, from a cruel leisure, exile  
without redress . . . [A]lways a great voice had been ringing in the ears of these forlorn,  
panicked people, a voice calling them back to the land of their desire, a homeland.  It lay 
outside the walls of the stifled, strangled town, in the fragrant brushwood of the hills, in 
the waves of the sea, under the free skies, and in the custody of love. . . .  As to what that 
exile and that longing for reunion meant, Rieux had no idea. . . .  [H]e was thinking it has 
no importance whether such things have or have not a meaning; all we need consider is 
the answer given to men’s hope.250    
 
This is the fulfillment that Camus considered important.  It is the fulfillment of hope, but hope, 
of course, must be realistic.  Hoping for a world that is not absurd is fanciful; whereas, hoping 
for love is more realistic and within the realm of possibility.  The citizens of Oran fully 
understand this lesson.  “They knew that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and 
sometimes attain, it is human love.  But for those who aspired beyond and above the human 
individual toward something they could not even imagine, there had been no answer.”251   
 Dr. Rieux finds his own fulfillment at the conclusion of the novel, despite suffering 
terribly from the personal losses of Tarrou and his wife.  Like D’Arrast in “The Growing Stone,” 
Rieux alleviates his burden by sharing the burden of others.  At the end of the novel, he observes 
the town from a rooftop terrace and feels completely at one with the townspeople with whom he 
had fought and suffered.   
The noises of the town were still beating like waves at the foot of the long line of  
terraces, but tonight they told not of revolt, but of deliverance. . . .  [I]t was on this level,  
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beyond all grief, that Rieux could feel himself at one with them.  And it was in the midst  
of shouts rolling against the terrace wall . . . that Dr. Rieux resolved to compile this  
chronicle, so that he should not be one of those who held his peace but should bear  
witness in favor of those plague-stricken people; so that some memorial of the injustice  
and outrage done them might endure; and to state quite simply what we learn in times of  
pestilence: that there are more things to admire in men than to despise.252
 
 Camus made it abundantly clear in The Plague that fulfillment is not only substantively 
limited, but also temporally limited.  It is not meant to last.  Another way of stating this is to say 
that the absurd cannot be abolished and will constantly reemerge.  As Tarrou put it, “What’s 
natural is the microbe.”253  The plague is a metaphor for the reoccurring absurdity of existence.  
Perhaps this is why Camus chose to end the novel in a tone that is somber but lucid: 
And, indeed, as he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux remembered 
that such joy is always imperiled.  He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but 
could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; 
that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its 
time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come 
when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send 
them forth to die in a happy city.254  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, it is necessary to establish the significance of fulfillment for Camus’s 
meditative ascent.  Voegelin argues that toward the end of the meditation, Camus’s “existential 
mood” changes.  “When the futuristic alienation from the present subsides, the joy of the here 
and now of existence begins stirring again.”255  When taken in comparison to the phases of 
absurdity and rebellion, the phase of fulfillment does seem more positive in nature.  Rather than 
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establishing what is missing from life, Camus realized in this phase that there is an answer to 
men’s hope.  The love and happiness that one experiences—even if only briefly—is enough to 
derive some hope from a life of rebellion against the absurd. 
 Hope, as a sensation, is parallel to the human desire for unity.  Camus did not consider 
religion to be a satisfactory answer to hope, and therefore, it is not a viable path to fulfillment.  
Art, on the other hand, is a fruitful source of fulfillment because the artist can capture, 
symbolize, and create intelligible instances of fulfillment.  By describing a beautiful landscape, 
or the love between a young couple, the artist implicitly glorifies the “here and now of 
existence.”  In The Plague, Camus gave significance to the loving bond between human beings 
by placing them in a situation of mutual suffering and resistance.  Moreover, by creating a story 
of mutual suffering and love, Camus acclaimed the common dignity of mankind.  The Plague is 
particularly inspiring in this respect.  It would be fair to conclude that affirming the common 
dignity of man was the main purpose of the novel.  Camus achieved this purpose by using his 
special gifts as an artist, and showing that a common bond between men is a beautiful, 
harmonious thing.  This is at once an ethic and an aesthetic construction.  In The Plague, these 
two dimensions complement each other seamlessly. 
 Essentially, fulfillment is not a final destination of Camus’s meditative journey.  It is, 
more appropriately, a convenient stopping point.  Fulfillment may offer some respite, but the true 
nature of existence for Camus is a struggle against the absurd.  For this reason, fulfillment 
reinforces the absurd.  The experience of love makes abandonment more acute, for example.  
The absurd, likewise, reinforces the fulfillment to be gained from everyday life.  This is the 
reason that Camus considers Sisyphus to be happy.  The knowledge that he could never evade 
his punishment causes Sisyphus to be more appreciative of the seemingly insignificant details of 
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his life.  Absurdity and fulfillment are inextricably linked in terms of Camus’s meditation, and 
rebellion is the act that mediates between them. 
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Structure of the Periagoge 
The preceding discussion of Camus’s meditation shows that Voegelin’s taxonomy is 
significant, but perhaps in a different sense than Voegelin intended.  Voegelin describes Camus’s 
meditation as a linear ascent in which he turns away from the depths of existence and ascends to 
the heights of truth.  That higher truth is an appreciation of present reality.  In Camus’s works, 
however, the progressive turn is not linear, but cyclical.  Camus did not explain this cycle in any 
systematic manner, but he did address it aesthetically. 
 Despite the remarkable insight into the thought of Camus that Voegelin offers, the 
structural description of Camus’s meditation is somewhat limited.  Voegelin implies that Camus 
systematically progressed through three mutually exclusive “phases” in a linear fashion.  He also 
argues that Camus had a “goal toward which he was moving.”256  Unlike the philosopher in 
Plato’s cave, however, Camus could not ascend beyond the experience of absurdity, “the depths 
of reality.”257  He actually made a conscious effort to remain within those depths and share the 
burden of others.  A fundamental aspect of Camus’s thought, however, is the assumption that the 
absurd cannot be reconciled.  Therefore, Camus did not truly ascend from the depths of existence 
to a vision of the Agathon.  Instead, he remained within the depths of the absurd and sought a 
foundation of values within these depths.  
 Voegelin admires Camus’s development in the second phase, especially because of his 
ability to steer clear of “substitute realities,” but Voegelin overlooks the passion that lies at the 
heart of rebellion.  He writes that Camus “accepts that the uncertainty concerning the meaning of 
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existence has to be endured.”258  This is a significant deviation from Camus’s description of 
rebellion in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel.  Camus argues that the absurd is a fact, but an 
abhorrent fact.  It cannot be accepted, only acknowledged.  Once it is acknowledged, however, 
the absurd necessitates rebellion insofar as it is detestable to man.  This, it must be mentioned, is 
a crucial distinction between Camus and Voegelin.  Voegelin argues that if a person “rebels 
against the [divine] ground,” that person “loses contact with reality.”259  Camus, on the other 
hand, insisted that human existence was fundamentally absurd, and therefore, one can be an 
authentic rebel without losing contact with reality.  Dr. Rieux, from The Plague denies God’s 
existence, but one can hardly accuse Rieux of being divorced from reality.  His authentic 
rebellion is rather a sign of lucidity because he continuously recognizes the absurdity of 
existence.  Only when lucidity fails, and the possibility of escaping the absurd is considered does 
the rebel lose contact with reality.   
 The third phase of Camus’s meditation, fulfillment, is nicely approximated by Voegelin.  
However, this phase of Camus’s meditation could not serve as a final stopping point or a goal, as 
Voegelin seems to suggest.  He writes that Camus’s progress was leading him toward a “loving 
tension toward the divine ground.”260  If the divine ground is taken to mean the community of 
men, this statement is quite accurate, but if the divine ground is taken as a metaphysical source 
of existence, the statement is misguided.  Camus did reveal an appreciation of the present, but 
this does not mean that he could abandon the absurd in the name of a metaphysical foundation.  
Rather, the appreciation of the present that emerges during the phase of fulfillment is also a 
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symptom of the absurd.  Camus considered life and existence to be absurd.  In such an absurd 
existence, the act of living is a form of rebellion.  Each moment, therefore, when one can 
appreciate the normal pleasures of everyday life, is a moment of fulfillment.  This fulfillment is 
amplified with the advent of absurdist consciousness and the realization that present experience 
is the only value.  Voegelin made a similar argument in Anamnesis: “There is no other reality 
than the one we experience.”261
 The purpose here is not to criticize Voegelin’s examination of Camus.  Voegelin’s 
taxonomy is useful, but not entirely sufficient to understand Camus’s meditation.  The preceding 
sections have shown that absurdity is an irrevocable characteristic of human existence.  Camus 
described the absurd as a “divorce” between the world and the nostalgic human.262  This divorce 
is the common existential condition of all humans, and human life is a continuous rebellion 
against the divorce in the name of unity.  Camus also speaks of “intense fulfillment” and a 
“harmony” between humans and the world.263  This harmony exists along side the absurd; it does 
not obviate it.  Camus realized that life moves in both directions: fulfillment and absurdity, 
harmony and divorce.  This is the true structure of his meditation.  It is not rigid and sequential, 
but fluid and spontaneous.  The absurd can arise unexpectedly, as can the harmony of fulfillment.  
This is clearly evident in The Plague; the joy and compassion experienced in the struggle is 
perhaps more surprising than the onset of the plague.   
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The Substance and Foundation of Values 
 Finally the discussion reverts back to the original question posed in this study.  Does 
Camus clearly identify life affirming values to combat the destructive influence of nihilism?  The 
argument here is that he did identify these values and their foundation, but he did so with an 
aesthetic approach using symbols in the context of narrative. Near the conclusion of The Rebel, 
Camus mentions an ethic while claiming that he wanted to establish “the common dignity of man 
and the world he lives in.”  This common dignity is to be founded upon the “living virtue” of 
“beauty.”264  Writing on Plotinus in his doctoral dissertation, he observed, “If things are 
intelligible, it is because things are beautiful.”265  Taking a lesson from Plotinus, Camus was 
attempting to use aesthetics rather than reason, art rather than philosophy, in order to establish 
the common dignity of man.  Voegelin’s structural taxonomy helps one to understand how.  If 
one views Camus’s meditation as a constant flux between harmony and divorce, one is in a better 
position to understand the aesthetic nature of Camus’s meditation.  This imagery indicates that 
fulfillment, a harmonious bond between men and the world, is a vision of unity or beauty.  
Camus’s meditation shows the path to recapturing this beauty while insisting that it cannot last 
forever.  Camus achieved this delicate balance in his novels by giving human life a style.  
Eubanks and Petrakis argue that Camus’s style is similar to the Greek concept of “sophron” or 
“moderation.”266  In his essay, “Helen’s Exile,” Camus praised the Greeks while criticizing  
Western European culture:  
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We have exiled beauty; the Greeks took up arms for it.  A basic difference—but one that  
goes far back. Greek thought was always based on the idea of limits.  Nothing was  
carried to extremes, neither religion nor reason, because Greek thought denied nothing,  
neither reason nor religion.  It gave everything its share, balancing light with shade.267
 
This style of moderation allowed Camus to imbue his novels with harmonious images of 
fulfillment without settling the divorce that accompanies the absurd.   
 Camus’s meditation, as it is revealed in The Plague, allows one to trace his symbolic 
development of values.  When the quarantine takes effect and town gates close, absurdity is 
established as the common condition of all.  The image of death, which pervades the novel, is a 
poignant representation of the absurd.  For example, the death of M. Othon’s child in The Plague 
is nonsensical.  Camus presented this image to illustrate, not to describe, the incomprehensible 
and absurd nature of death.  Camus also used the symbol of pathos to communicate the anguish 
and exile that accompanies the absurd.  As the citizens of Oran are faced with the absurd, they 
become aware that all are “in the same boat”268  The awareness of the absurd coincides with a 
recognition that all must face the absurd collectively.  Camus revealed that rebellion against the 
absurd must remain focused on the immediacy of the situation.  The citizens of Oran learn that 
human action is fundamentally limited in its ability to alleviate the absurdity of existence.  Dr. 
Rieux provides a lasting image of such limited rebellion.  Petrakis and Eubanks argue that Rieux 
is a symbol of not only rebellion, but of “authentic political action. Dr. Rieux personifies the 
concrete, immanent struggle against human suffering, which is intuitive as well as rational and 
which, by awakening a community of resistance against injustice, transcends subjectivity.”269  
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Rieux shows that any lucid acts of rebellion must be conducted in the name of present life that 
holds the promise of fulfillment.  Such fulfillment arises from an appreciation of present reality 
that is reinforced by the existence of the absurd.  In this sense, the absurd and fulfillment are not 
opposing forces, but complementary forces.   
The absurd convinces us that nothing can substitute for lived experience, even if that 
experience is one of shared suffering.  For some, Camus’s philosophy of fulfillment is too 
limited, too pessimistic.  This, however, is precisely the lesson to be gained from Camus’s 
meditation.  He realized that his contemporaries embraced values without considering the 
metaphysical constructs that support those values.  Because Camus could not identify a 
metaphysical foundation outside of lived experience, he focused on small victories over the 
absurd.  It is on this level of shared suffering that friendship, love and compassion—values that 
uphold life—can be fostered.  
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